Special: THE NEW RIGHT

AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE

CovertAction Information Bulletin



EDITORIAL

Since our last issue, the Reagan administration has moved into Washington, filling nearly every available government post with ultra-conservatives so far to the right that the fears of everyone before inauguration have been shown to be inadequate. The so-called New Right is not wasting any time; attempts to implement the most extreme of Reagan's policies, at home and around the world, are under way.

The New Right in Power

One of the most serious moves is the establishment of a Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. A report

in this issue explains how dangerous this subcommittee can be, how it represents the cutting edge of a return to the Cold War and McCarthyism. But the SST is only one of a number of direct attacks upon progressive forces. There are plans for a new Un-American Activities Committee in the House of Representatives, and the government has announced that it intends to amend the Executive Order of the Carter administration which attempted to place some minimal limitations on illegal FBI and CIA activities. [See sidebar.] Moves to exempt the FBI and the CIA and other intelligence agencies from the Freedom of Information Act are well under way. And, of course, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act is moving through the new, more conservative Congress.

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In an ominous move, the SST has taken jurisdiction in the Senate over the bill, as have both intelligence committees. Bills identical to those discussed, but not passed last year, have been introduced, as have some even more extreme in their prohibitions. One Member of Congress has even introduced a bill which makes it a crime to name intelligence personnel incorrectly! Some of the more outrageous Reagan appointments are discussed in this issue. It is clear that the advocates of a stronger and more unrestrained CIA can be found at all levels of all agencies. Also in this issue Fred Landis presents some interesting insights into the sinister linkages which can be found between and among these appointees and their mentors. We also take a look at the dubious back-

Proposed Executive Order Change on Domestic Intelligence Gathering

On March 10, a typewritten proposed amendment of Executive Order 12036 was simultaneously leaked to all the major U.S. media. That Order was issued by President Carter on January 24, 1978, and purported to impose certain limitations on intelligence activities, particularly prohibiting domestic CIA activity of the sort which had become notorious in Operation CHAOS and Operation MKULTRA. It also imposed certain limitations on FBI activity, setting relatively strict standards of suspicion before what are euphemistically called "intrusive methods" could be used. This term refers to break-ins, wiretaps, burglaries, provocations, infiltrations, and so on.

The Reagan administration draft amendment not only lifted most of the minimal restrictions previously imposed on the FBI; it also—probably illegally, given the 1947 statute which created the CIA—opened the door to CIA domestic spying and use of intrusive methods. There was an immediate outcry over the projected unleashing of the CIA at home, leading to denials from the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, that the CIA had any intention of expanding its domestic activities. Indeed, though Inman would not admit it, the CIA has never ceased all of its illegal domestic activity, with or without an Executive Order.

The unusual leak of a draft of this sensitive nature, coupled with the denials relating to the CIA, raises a serious question. By including the CIA, leaking the document, and then backing away from the CIA portions of the proposal, the government has managed to make most people, especially the media, ignore the provisions which relate to the FBI, which will most likely be enacted. These provisions are frightening; they legitimize virtually all the aspects of the FBI's COINTELPRO operations of the 1960s and 1970s. For example, shown here are the proposed regulations relating to infiltration of domestic organizations. Carter's Order required that such participation be "in the course of a lawful investigation;" the proposal is limited to "any lawful purpose," a much vaguer standard. Carter's Order required that the organization "is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power;" there is no such limitation in the new proposal. The Carter Order also said that such infiltration could not be "for the purpose of

influencing the activity of the organization or its members," another restriction which has been removed.

This is just one example. The proposal contains many such authorizations for intrusive spying and manipulation by the FBI and other intelligence agencies, even if all the references to the CIA are removed. This proposal, which can go into effect simply with the signature of the President, must be opposed. Persons wishing further information should write to: The Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Massachusetts Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20002.

Portion of Proposed Executive Order

"2-206. Undisclosed Participation in Domestic

Organizations. In accordance with procedures established under section 2-201, employees of agencies within the Intelligence

Community may join, or otherwise participate in an organization within the United States on behalf of an agency within the Intelligence Community for any lawful purpose without disclosing their intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, provided:

- (a) Participation by any agency other than the FBI for purposes of acquiring information about the organization or any United States person who is a member thereof is strictly limited in its nature, scope and duration to a lawful purpose related to foreign intelligence and nondisclosure is necessary to achieve that purpose; and
- (b) Participation by the CIA for purposes of affecting the activities of the organization is limited to attaining legitimate foreign intelligence objectives when the appropriate officials to whom disclosure normally would be made are foreign nationals or the organization involved is owned or controlled by a foreign organization or government or is working for or on behalf of a foreign organization or government and such participation is conducted in a manner that provides due protection for constitutional rights.

ground of the new Director of the CIA, William Casey.

The Situation in Latin America

The immediate focal point of administration hardline, reactionary politics is El Salvador. Why Reagan and Secretary of State Haig chose the issue of El Salvador to revive Cold War hysteria is hard to understand, and extremely perplexing to U.S. allies in Europe, who know that they provide the battlefield for any limited East-West confrontation. They also recognize, as the U.S. government apparently does not, that *nobody* will win a nuclear war.

It seems that the possibility of an imminent victory by the revolutionary forces in El Salvador simply surfaced as the Reagan-Haig team was settling into their new offices, and they decided to put their Cold War policies immediately into effect. In our lead articles this issue, we try to analyze the situation in El Salvador and in Guatemala, where a similar struggle against an equally repressive regime is under way. It is unlikely that the United States under Reagan can hold back the forces of history any more than it could under his predecessors, but it is necessary for the world to comprehend fully, as do the victims, the extent of the human suffering which must be attributed to direct U.S. interference.

Stop the Press

Developments in El Salvador also provided a striking example of the power of the new administration to flummox and bully the press and, indeed, of the subservience of the U.S. media. Concerned that the press was looking too closely into conditions in El Salvador, and afraid that the press might question the suspect White Paper which the State Department circulated, the government took the unusual step of calling a special State Department background briefing for correspondents at which they announced that the press was making too much of a "big deal" out of El Salvador. The press huffed and puffed for a day or two; Secretary Haig said they didn't really mean it; but, within days El Salvador was off the front pages. Hardly anyone was seriously questioning the authenticity of the White Paper, and no one was protesting the ever-increasing number of U.S. troops being sent to El Salvador. A new Vietnam was in the making and the press was afraid to say anything.

Africa

Of course, the government had to throw a new bone to the journalists; that was Africa, in particular southern Africa. A column by the conservative writers Evans and Novak presaged this move. Why, they asked, was so much attention being paid to the Caribbean. The real riches are in southern Africa. Almost at once, a dozen indications appeared that the new administration was going to identify itself more and more intimately with South Africa. At a time when South Africa's intransigence is irritating even its European allies and customers, when South Africa is sabotaging any attempts to settle the future of Namibia peace-

fully, raiding and bombing neighboring Angola every day, refusing to modify any of its apartheid laws, the United States is signaling its support for South Africa to the world. The President referred to South Africa as one of the U.S.'s closest allies and friends; he is contemplating inviting the South African Prime Minister to the U.S. on an official visit, something which has never been done before. Savimbi is also on his way. The administration is pressing for the overthrow of the MPLA government in Angola and the destabilization of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique. The white puppet "leader" of Namibia has already been paraded around Washington.

It is in this context that CAIB found itself used by the State Department to deflect consideration of an extremely serious charge levelled against the U.S. government. When the government of Mozambique expelled six CIA officers and agents in March, it accused them, among other things, of direct involvement in the South African raid which, in January, had ended in the brutal murders of twelve South African exiles and the kidnapping back to South Africa and certain torture of three others. It is rare that another government accuses the United States of involvement in mass murder, but it is rarer still that the U.S. media does not even investigate the allegations.

This occurred because the State Department responded to the allegations by not discussing them, but by blaming the expulsions on Cuban intelligence agents and the staff of CAIB. As we note in our article discussing the Mozambique spy ring, we were not even in Maputo at the time the State Department said we were, but this is irrelevant. What is shocking is that to this day no establishment media has even looked into the Mozambican charges.

More on Africa

We did spend six weeks in Africa, attending the Second Congress of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Apartheid Regimes in Southern Africa, in Luanda, Angola, visiting the frontlines of the incessant South African war against Angola, and the SWAPO refugee camps, and meeting with journalists and politically conscious observers in several other countries. Next issue we will present a number of articles on the situation in Africa.

This Issue

This issue is primarily devoted to Central America and to the new U.S. administration, but we also include some interesting material in our regular columns: Sources and Methods, News Notes, Naming Names, and Publications of Interest. This is also, as our subscribers will observe, a larger issue than usual. We apologize to everyone for the delay in preparing and distributing this issue, which was due primarily to our Africa trip. Our next issue will follow more quickly than usual.

Finally we want to thank everyone who responded to our appeal for contributions. It has been a big help, and we will be thanking everyone individually.

THE UNITED STATES IN EL SALVADOR

By Stewart Klepper

Jorges Plutarco Dominguez was the justice of the peace in Zacatecoluca, a town about 25 miles south of San Salvador. On the morning of December 3, 1980 peasants woke him and told of four mutilated bodies, lying by the side of the road outside town. The National Guard was on the scene when Dominguez arrived, and had dug a six-foot trench in which to bury the bodies. Though mutilated, the bodies were identifiable, but with the National Guard present Dominguez filled out blank death certificates stating that the identities of the dead were not known.


The women were American Catholic missionaries involved in relief work—feeding and teaching nutrition in the countryside. They had disappeared the previous night; it took another full day, until the fourth, for the U.S. Embassy to find out about the murders. Outraged that Americans should be shot like Salvadorans, Ambassador Robert White rushed to the burial site. Here he met Mr. Dominguez, who briefly explained the events he had participated in. The evidence was damning: the missionaries had disappeared while returning from the airport around midnight, after being seen at a National Guard checkpoint, and by dawn the Guard had already hand-dug a mass grave. "I as a former ditch-digger can tell you it takes a long time to dig a trench that large," White was quoted as saying. "This time they won't get away with it, they just won't."

In Washington, news of the deaths breathed a trace of life into Carter's moribund human rights campaign. The administration announced that U.S. aid would be suspended pending a thorough investigation, and a high-level investigation, headed by William Bowdler, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was dispatched to El Salvador. Bowdler and his team met on December 7 with four members of the ruling junta (Col. Adolfo Majano was absent—more on him later). The same day Dominguez was abducted from his home by masked gunmen. On Monday the eighth, Bowdler promised a complete investigation, and the junta obliged by launching four separate investigations. Dominguez, the most credible witness, was found in a field that day; he had been shot in the head and his throat cut. President Duarte commented: "A chief cannot be held responsible for the actions of a subordinate...if anyone has proof, let him present it; if not, he should avoid speculation."

The Right: Government by Deathsquad

The people who killed Dominguez represent the real

power in El Salvador. In the common meaning of the term, they are the government of the country. They control the military and administer justice, usually summary execution. They are the deathsquads and the military right, led by retired General Chele Medrano, founder of ORDEN, and Roberto D'Aubuisson, a younger man who had been in charge of torture under Gen. Romero. [See sidebar.] Neither man now holds an official position, yet their power is paramount. By contrast, the nominal government's writ runs to the U.S. Embassy and local radio stations, where its appearance of legitimacy is of considerable propaganda value.



Hands over their heads, these nuns hope to avoid being murdered.

Bowdler didn't want or expect the investigations to show any governmental involvement in the Americans' murders. Of the 17,000 plus political killings in El Salvador, there is general agreement that the right is responsible for at least 80 percent. But not a single person has been arrested in any of these cases—though, in scenes reminiscent of the denouement of the movie "Z," several investigators have been murdered.

The investigations were a charade, and within six weeks all U.S. aid had been restored by Carter, Bowdler did have important business to conduct in El Salvador, however. He was presiding over the latest changes in government. As he met with four junta members it was reported that the fifth member, Col. Majano, had been ousted by a vote of the Army officers he represented. The first tally was put at 300 to 4; later it was reported as 300 to 180. As there are over 700 officers in the Army, the claim of progressive officers

that they had never participated in the vote is persuasive.

Ironically, only a year before, Bowdler had been in El Salvador helping arrange a bloodless *coup* which ousted Gen. Romero and installed the first "revolutionary" junta, a mixed group of reformers and reactionaries. The leader of the reform-minded officers was Col. Majano.

The First Junta

El Salvador was in turmoil when Bowdler arrived in October of 1979. Inspired by the recent revolution in Nicaragua, popular organizations were growing and unifying rapidly. Capital was leaving the country. Internationally, the governments of France, Britain and West Germany had withdrawn their Ambassadors in protest over the increasingly bloody repression. In June alone, 27 schoolteachers had been killed, teachers being considered the "brains" of the popular organizations.

In this charged atmosphere, coups were being planned by both right and left. In May, Majano and his troops thwarted a rightist coup attempt when he was tipped off and had his men surround a farmhouse. Inside was D'Aubuisson. Majano arrested him, and ordered him held in a military barracks, but he was quickly released.

In October, Majano and a group of 40 progressive young officers decided the only hope of saving the country lay in removing their corrupt superiors and instituting economic reforms. Bowdler also wanted a change, since supporting the bloody and discredited regime of Gen. Romero had become an embarrassment. He also thought that moderate reforms would reduce the likelihood of another successful revolution.

Needing American support, Majano and his supporters met with Bowdler and struck a deal. Romero was out without a shot being fired. A new junta, comprised of two military officers and three civilians, took power. For its first choice, the young officers unanimously elected Majano. Son of campesino parents, Majano was known for his integrity and sympathy for the people. The officers' second choice was Col. Rene Guerra y Guerra, but Bowdler and company vetoed him and presented instead the names of two officers "acceptable" to the U.S.—Cols. Jaime Garcia and Jose Gutierrez.

Garcia and Gutierrez were well known to Bowdler, partly through the ANTEL connection. ANTEL is the Salvadoran communications company, and is closely associated with ITT, the company that worked hardest, in close cooperation with the CIA, to overthrow Allende. Garcia had been ANTEL's president, Gutierrez a manager. ANTEL jobs are plum positions for the military, as it gives out lucrative contracts and provides an opportunity to meet U.S. corporate leaders. Gutierrez became a member of the junta, and Garcia became Minister of Defense. Another position went to an American choice, Mario Andino, who had been working for Conelca, a subsidiary of the U.S. mining firm, Phelps-Dodge.

The remaining positions went to Roman Mayorga, rec-

tor of the Catholic University, and Dr. Guillermo Ungo. who represented a coalition of political parties including the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. With these moderate reformers in the majority, the first junta planned serious structural reforms of the economy, including nationalization of the banking system and land reform. They also proclaimed the abolition of ORDEN, the official deathsquad which had formerly been a part of the Ministry of Defense, with offices in the National Guard headquarters. This proclamation had little effect however, as Medrano instantly reconstituted it, and its ties with the military continued unimpaired. One of the elements of the deal that Bowdler had struck was that there would be no arrests after the coup; when members of the junta appealed to Gutierrez and Garcia to stop the terror, they found themselves in the same position as so many other victims of the Salvadoran right, with their thumbs tied behind their

"Real power is exercised by the head of the Ministry of Defense and Public Safety [Garcia] and several military commanders," Enrique Alvarez Cordova wrote in his letter of resignation, dated January 3, 1980. Alvarez Cordova was Minister of Agriculture in the first junta, and had drawn up a plan for implementing land reform which was comprehensive and capable of working. It called for peasants to receive plots of land which would be worked as co-ops, with the co-ops united into a series of collectives capable of mediating between the peasants and the government, the banks, and other national entities too large to respond to two million peasants individually. This plan went to Washington, where AID and State Department officials reviewed and rejected it. Collectives smelled of communism to them, and in fact the plan would have provided a measure of power for the peasants.

The Second Junta

Unable to make progress with land reform, and witnessing increasing rightwing terror which Garcia and Gutierrez either couldn't or wouldn't control, Alvarez Cordova, Ungo, and the brilliant young Minister of Education, Salvador Samayoa resigned together, bringing down the first junta. It had lasted less than 3 months. Samayoa held a press conference where he announced that he was joining the popular forces—at which point he picked up an automatic rifle and left. After a few months' reflection, Cordova and Ungo joined him.

In early February of 1980, Bowdler was on the road again, this time to Bonn and Madrid in search of support for direct military intervention in support of the shaky second junta. He didn't find any, though Venezuela had expressed interest in the idea. By now the right was back in firm control of the military. Since the beginning of the first junta the right had used promotions, transfers, and changes of duty assignments to break the influence of the reformist officers. Now it seemed they might be poised to launch a *coup* of their own. Meanwhile, Gutierrez was in Texas convalescing from major surgery. In late February he received a visit from officials of the State Department, who urged that he return to his country with dispatch. He did.

With Gutierrez back in position, a new bargain was made. The right would refrain from an overt *coup*. It could bring into the junta partners of its choice; it chose members of the now largely discredited Christian Democratic Party, namely Napoleon Duarte and Morales Ehrlich. Land reform would be implemented by the right—a selfdestruct mechanism for any true reform. To seal the pact, AID would provide upwards of \$35,000,000 in funds for land reform, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) would "advise" on the project.

Land Reform: The Big Lie

To appreciate the importance of land reform, one need know only a few facts about El Salvador. It is the smallest and most densely populated country in the continental Americas, with over 5,000,000 people shoehorned into just over 8,000 square miles of land, for a population density of over 600 per square mile. Conditions for the vast majority of people have been deteriorating for over a century, as coffee and later cotton plantations expanded at the expense of subsistence farming. While 2% of the population owns 60% of the land, half the people earn less than \$200 a year. Gradual starvation is a greater killer than the deathsquads; the infant mortality rate in El Salvador is over 58 per 1000 births, compared to 12 in the U.S. and 22 in Jamaica.

Land is by far the most important source of wealth, and the elite wants to keep it. Even cosmetic reforms have been resisted, as they would stimulate the people's appetite for land without satisfying the hunger.

U.S. policy has been sporadically to encourage moderate land reforms in hopes of defusing popular pressures for more radical change. The agent of U.S. policy in this field had been AIFLD—a well known and well used CIA front which is officially one of three foreign organizing branches of the AFL-CIO. This non-secret is common knowledge in Washington. On January 14, 1981, Solicitor General Wade McCree stated before the Supreme Court that two AIFLD consultants, recently killed in El Salvador, were actually undercover agents posing as labor officials. Later McCree's office issued a denial claiming that his statement was hypothetical, though the transcript doesn't bear this out.*

But this is getting ahead of our story. AIFLD's activities in El Salvador began in 1966. In 1968 it set up the Union Comunal Salvadorena (UCS), endowing it with a score of small co-ops which quickly attracted several thousand peasant members. This effort was not appreciated by the Salvadoran government, however, and in 1973 it took the unprecedented step of kicking AIFLD out of the country.

That year AIFLD had appointed Torres Laso to be the local program director. Laso was a Nicaraguan by birth,

and had been a prosecutor for Somoza, but had fallen from favor and fled his country for the U.S. In two years he was a U.S. citizen and AIFLD hired him. The Salvadoran government thought he was a CIA man, and didn't trust him. When the Salvadoran government demanded he be removed AIFLD refused, and was bluntly invited to leave the country. This move makes sense in the context of Salvadoran politics. The right has never been receptive to U.S. involvement in the country's affairs, as the U.S. policy has been to promote industrialization through investment by U.S. businesses in El Salvador, while the right's agenda has been to continue the feudal pattern of land holdings. U.S.-sponsored land reform has been seen as promoting the interests of the urban-industrial sector at the expense of the land barons in the countryside. In any event, AIFLD retained control of UCS by continuing to pay its officials in El Salvador.

On the 28th of June, 1979, as the Sandanistas were consolidating their final victory, AIFLD came back to El Salvador, the process smoothed by substantial aid money. When Alvarez Cordova's plan was rejected, AIFLD had the land reform field to itself. Its plan was a modification of his, with collectives out and a significant addition—preceding land reform there would be declared a State of Siege, suspending constitutional rights while the program was put in place. Primary credit for this new plan goes to Roy Prosterman.

Prosterman: Phoenix From the Ashes

Roy Prosterman had gained his experience in land reform in Vietnam, where he helped formulate the "land to the tiller" program (a phrase lifted from Lenin). "Land to the tiller" was the overt side of the CIA's Operation Phoenix, which assassinated more than 45,000 peasants it claimed were communists or "sympathizers," and uprooted many thousands more from their ancestral land into fortified hamlets. In a 1971 Congressional hearing, then CIA Director Colby stated: "One of the goals of Phoenix is to make the tiller of the land its owner." In fact, Phoenix was notable as the program that took no prisoners; every suspect died during or after interrogation, often pushed from a helicopter. Short on helicopters, the Salvadoran deathsquads have developed homespun methods of terrorizing the population, such as hacking their victims to pieces with machetes and pouring acid over their faces. In a bizarre twist, Prosterman insists that his program was quite beneficial and that parts of it were continued in Vietnam after its liberation.

Later Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos hired Prosterman to create the Philippines'land reform program—noted for its failure to improve the life of the people and its give-away concessions to multinational agribusinesses such as Castle & Cooke and United Brands. He became friends with Werner Erhart, founder of EST, and joined the "Hunger Project", a "non-ideological" program to help people "develop a framework in which they feel comfortable in dealing with the hunger problem." The Hunger Project has fed Erhart and his colleagues well, but has not sent any appreciable amount of food overseas.

^{*} According to the official Supreme Court transcript, McCree said, "... just recently two Americans have been killed in Salvador. Apparently they were some kind of undercover persons working under the cover of a labor organization...."

Prosterman is a professor at the University of Washington School of Law, where he teaches occasionally. He describes himself as having "volunteered his services as a consultant to UCS and AIFLD in El Salvador." AIFLD picks up his travel expenses, though his salary comes from private benefactors.

With the fall of the first junta in January of 1980, Prosterman appeared as a high-level consultant for the AIFLD program, which was enjoying a brief prosperity in El Salvador. AIFLD rented two floors of the San Salvador Sheraton, and dozens of American "consultants" were observed shuttling between El Salvador and Washington. One of the shuttlers was Michael Hammer, a key man in AIFLD's Latin American program. Born in Paris of German parents, he spent much of his youth in Ecuador. He joined AIFLD while still a student at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and worked for AIFLD until his death. During the 1970's he supervised the UCS program, grooming Rodolfo Viera for the presidency of UCS, and later of the Agrarian Reform Institute (ISTA). A simple man who was proud of his peasant ancestry, Viera lacked organizational ability and leadership of UCS and ISTA was largely exercised by Viera's second in command, Lionel Gomez.

The AIFLD land reform plan was announced on March 6, and Viera was installed as head of ISTA to preside over the operation. The first phase of land reform was supposed to effect 376 estates of over 1,200 acres, turning the nationalized land over to co-operatives of formerly landless peasants. These colono peasants had never been organized into co-operatives before, and any attempts to take independent actions on "their" land resulted in death. In a NACLA report an ISTA official describes the process: "The troops came and told the workers the land was theirs now. They could elect their own leadership and run co-ops. The peasants couldn't believe their ears, but they held elections that very night. The next morning the troops came back, and I watched as they shot every one of the elected leaders."

With this turn of events, the last reformist civilians left the government. Jorge Alberto Villacorta, Assistant Minister of Agriculture, who had stayed on until March because of the promise that land reform would take place, submitted his resignation. He stated: "From the very first moment of the implementation of Agrarian Reform, what we saw was a sharp increase in the official violence against the very peasants who were supposed to be the beneficiaries . . . In the last three months, a great number of peasants belonging to the agrarian reform sector have been killed: likewise several technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture and ISTA, who are advisers and co-managers of these properties, have fallen victim to the repression. These bloody acts have been carried out by uniformed men of the National Guard and Treasury Police, accompanied by civilians of ORDEN." Villacorta was subject to several death threats from the right, and subsequently fled the country.

In May of 1980 Prosterman returned to San Salvador and arranged a meeting with Gutierrez, which was cool and unproductive. Increasingly he feared for his own life.

Through the summer Prosterman did his consulting from Costa Rica. The obvious failure of land reform did not deter him from engaging in a high-profile propaganda campaign extolling its virtues. In the June issue of the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union News Prosterman was effusive: "With. . . strong support from the United States, the ruling junta has. . . transferred land probably representing 50% of all the cultivated land in the country."

In a final irony, as Prosterman's article was being published, the UCS itself rejected his land reform program. On June 5 the executive councils of the UCS in 8 provinces signed a letter to the Salvadoran people stating that, "we feel we cannot continue to support this agrarian reform." This decision was prompted by the massacre of 12 UCS members by the National Guard.

Nothing deters Prosterman, however, and as late as February 8, 1981 he wrote in the New York Times: "In 1979 El Salvador had Latin-America's highest ratio of tenant farmers to the general population. It now has none." Also, "The reform was basically self-implementing." Translation: we declared land reform and pulled out. Later he admits that giving the peasants title will take a while—"aerial computer surveys will make possible issuance of most of the titles within a year." The Washington Post was able to establish that as of the middle of February, 800 titles had been given under the land reform program, leaving only 1,999,200 landless peasants in the countryside.

With prospects for land reform at an end, and under increasing attack from the deathsquads and the security forces, UCS and the ISTA workers in the countryside went over to the popular organizations, beginning in the summer of last year. The right took this as proof they had been correct all along. Reform with repression was a dangerous mistake, an incompatible schism in policy. The CIA, with its unwanted land reform program, had created a monster. AIFLD now had enemies on both sides of the war. Prosterman ordered his men to avoid the maximum security Sheraton Hotel, whose guards were a deterrent to the left but in sympathy with the right. Michael Hammer, the old AIFLD hand who had been instrumental in setting up UCS and later ISTA, began sleeping in a different location every night. Hammer and the local program director of AIFLD, Richard Oulahan, requested that AID send them armoured Cherokee jeeps, and one was delivered.

Viera was also deeply disillusioned by the continuing slaughter of his people. "People must work within the framework of the reforms, or the army will chop off their heads," he had repeatedly argued. But now he began talking of going over to the popular forces himself. He traveled to the U.S. around Thanksgiving, and expressed this sentiment to many people. Afraid of losing the shreds of credibility its land reform policy still retained, U.S. officials urged Viera in the strongest terms to return and give the program one more chance.

He returned, but nothing changed, and by December he was again ready to quit. AIFLD officials called Prosterman and tried to persuade him to go to El Salvador and meet

with Viera. Depressed and afraid, Prosterman refused. Hammer got the assignment by default, and on January 3, 1981 he and Mark Pearlman, who had joined AIFLD after law school and two years subdividing suburban tracts in California, met Viera in the San Salvador Sheraton's coffee shop.

Why they chose the Sheraton is a mystery. Perhaps they viewed Prosterman and his rules as now irrelevant. Probably they viewed the main threat to the Americans' lives as coming from the left. Or maybe it was simply as bad a choice as any. While they were sipping coffee, several well dressed young men walked past the numerous security guards in the hotel, into the coffee shop, where they donned masks and opened fire on the trio, killing them all. Then the assassins walked out, past the same guards. Duarte himself credits the right with these killings—our sources indicate it was D'Aubuisson's White Warriors [see sidebar] who did the job.

Death Valley Days

It is a little noted fact that shortly after Reagan's election victory the wholesale killing of Americans began. Correctly, the deathsquad right perceived that massive American support was in the bag—and restraint, what little there had been, was thrown to the wind. The first manifestation of this change in policy by the right occurred on November 29, when uniformed members of the National Guard and Treasury Police raided a Catholic highschool where the top leadership of the political opposition was meeting to plan a press conference. Among those present was Enrique Alvarez Cordova, who had joined the Democratic Revolutionary Front after leaving his post as Minister of Agriculture, and was elected its president. Also present was Juan Chacon, a man of great charisma, who had been radicalized when his father, a poor peasant organizer, had been abducted and murdered in 1977, and his face flayed with a knife.



Juan Chacon speaking on behalf of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc, several months before he was kidnapped and killed by an ORDEN deathsquad.

Chacon, Cordova, and 27 others were carried off into the night. The next day the mutilated bodies of Chacon, Cordova, and four other leaders were found lying in the road. Twenty-three others remain missing. It is said that when Chacon's body was discovered his fist was clenched above his head, in a final defiance of his killers. With these murders the chance of a political settlement also died—no opposition leader could come forward to negotiate without risking death.

And shortly thereafter the nuns, Hammer and Pearlman, an American freelance writer, and an American "advising" the police, were all shot dead. And all killed by the right, or, in one case, by bodyguards of junta member Morales Ehrlich. The right expected a blank check from Reagan; in the meantime they would end unwanted Yankee interference in their affairs.

Events have proved the deathsquads were correct. At the time of this writing the reformist Majano is under arrest, his fate uncertain. The butcher D'Aubuisson has reappeared, giving an interview that was published in the New York Times March 4, in which he bragged of his ties to the Reagan administration, particularly to Roger Fontaine, now Richard Allen's aide for Latin America on the National Security Council, and unnamed officials of the CIA. D'Aubuisson called for a rightwing coup, saying that the Reagan administration would not object to such a move—and later in the day the U.S. Embassy was sprayed with rightist gunfire. Ominously, D'Aubuisson went on to outline the right's designs: first to end the pretense of reforms, then to invade Nicaragua.

Reagan's response has been to state that the U.S. would view such a *coup* with grave concern—but no sanctions were threatened. Indeed, the greatest deterrent to a right-wing *coup* is that there is little to gain from such a move, *de facto* control being more expedient at the moment than *de jure* governance.

White Paper and Black Propaganda: The Lies About El Salvador

On February 23 a new phase in the Salvadoran struggle took shape. In Special Report Number 80, the State Department attempted to document "Communist Military Intervention" in El Salvador. An eight-page summary of alleged evidence in the form of captured documents was widely distributed, while Lawrence Eagleburger took the "proof" to Europe for inspection by its heads of government. As a Big Lie, the white paper was initially successful: The summary, a collection of allegations that the Salvadoran popular forces had received upward of 800 tons of arms from Vietnam and Ethiopia, delivered via Cuba and Nicaragua, was widely printed in the U.S. media. The "proof" of communist involvement was less widely circulated, and went virtually unanalyzed by the U.S. media.

This "proof" is a 178-page document which consists of original papers supposedly captured in November of last year, along with English translations and an abstracted chronology. The "proof" represents what is called "black

The "Grocery Store Papers"

Press Strains Credulity

The Boston Globe called him the "State Department code-breaker;" Karen De Young of the Washington Post said his role "is described as more that of one of Smiley's people than of James Bond." But Hodding Carter, III, former State Department spokesman, in the Wall Street Journal, said he was responsible for a report which was "swallowed whole and regurgitated in a fashion not equalled since the Johnson administration's white paper on Vietnam 15 years ago."

They all were writing about Jon Glassman, 37, political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, who researched and assembled the 178-page White Paper entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador." Although Glassman participated in the February 23 State Department briefing which unveiled the White Paper, nothing was said at the time of his personal detective role in the drama. Nearly a month later, after, as Hodding Carter pointed out, the U.S. press accepted the incredible report virtually without question, and they had been shuttled around Europe less successfully in an attempt to garner support for the growing direct U.S. role in El Salvador, Glassman granted an interview in Mexico to attempt to answer the question which should have been asked before, but wasn't. Where had the documents come from?

Before assignment to Mexico, Glassman had served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, at the State Department's Soviet desk, and spent two years at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. From Mexico he had attended the 1979 Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, where, as noted in CAIB Number 6, he continually briefed U.S. media representatives on the significance of speeches he had not listened to, and, on several occasions, got himself thrown out of guests-only hotel lobbies where he was accosting delegates. (Regularly attending his briefings was Karen De Young, author of the March 14, 1981 puff piece entitled "Sleuth of the Salvador Papers.")

Glassman's interview with the progressive Mexico City daily, Uno Mas Uno, was quickly picked up by the U.S. press, though the source was never mentioned. His tale, apparently designed to give the White Paper the human face journalists seek for the feature pages, unfolded like a third-rate detective story. In November—after Reagan's election—the Salvadoran police had allegedly captured a pile of documents in an art gallery owned by Toni Handal, the brother of Shafik Handal, leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party. They helpfully described an arms shopping trip Shafik Handal

had made to Moscow and Eastern Europe, with numerous promises of military hardware listed in some detail. Toni Handal has since "disappeared," and is, of course, unable to challenge any of this "evidence."

But, said Glassman, these documents were unconvincing. He was not interested in promises of arms; he was looking for deliveries of arms. On January 16 he was sent back to El Salvador to look for more evidence. He met with Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia and the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran Army. Was there anything else besides the Handal documents, he wondered. One security officer apparently pointed to a plastic bag sitting on a dusty desk, noting that the documents inside the bag had been captured ten days earlier, but that they had not been able to make anything of them. Glassman opened the bag, and, in his words, "found a gold mine." (According to the March 23 Time magazine, the bag was captured in a grocery store; neither Uno Mas Uno nor any other paper carried this bit of information.) The rest was history.

Glassman brought the papers back to Washington, and after "burning the midnight oil" night after night, produced the White Paper, the likes of which hadn't been seen in Washington since the Gulf of Tonkin fabrication. Glassman's main feat was to discover that the code name "Esmeralda" meant Cuba, and the code name "Lagos" meant Nicaragua. This great deduction stemmed from tricky references to the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory held in Lagos and meetings with "Comrade Fid.," the Prime Minister of Esmeralda. (Esmeralda is also the name for the island of Cuba in a famous Cuban folk song.) As De Young pointed out, "more than one State Department officer, harking back to suspicions of an over-zealous intelligence community, has referred to [the documents] discovery and contents as 'a little too convenient.' "

Hodding Carter also noted that, at best, the documents make a mountain out of a molehill. Even if genuine—which is extremely unlikely—the documents suggest an influx of approximately 200 tons of materiel. An unnamed Pentagon official had already pointed out that 200 tons of military equipment "would be used up by a 200-man company in one week of hard fighting." Yet this, the administration said, "underscores the central role played by Cuba" in the "arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador." It is hard to understand how one week's ammunition could be "central" in a civil war of many years' duration.

The relative insignificance of 200 tons of materiel is further underscored by the details of the \$5 million in military supplies which President Carter rushed to El Salvador just before the end of his term. That aid amounted to over 3000 tons, and it was delivered in less than a week.

Finally, there is the "evidence" of the documents themselves. As noted in the adjoining article, some are completely illegible; some contain merely columns of numbers which must, on faith, be taken to represent arms or ammunition; some contain mixed writing and typing; some contain non-Spanish usages or non-Salvadoran slang. As Philip Agee pointed out in a recent press conference, the entire operation bears the trademarks of CIA falsifications which have been practiced incessantly over some thirty years. That there is skepticism in Europe is to be commended; that there is a slavish acceptance of the administration's line in the United States is, as Hodding Carter noted, inexplicable.

Typical U.S. Media Coverage of El Salvador

On February 22, 1981 the New York Times carried a "Special to the New York Times" from correspondent Edward Schumacher, datelined San Salvador, and detailing an interview with "four guerrilla commanders." Three of the four were quoted; one was named Eduardo, another was named Marcos, and the third was described as "another commander, named Ali Hondro, a soft-featured man with long fuzzy sideburns who appeared to be the senior man in the group."

"Ali Hondro" is named four times in the brief article, which injected the only humorous note of the

and military experience we have been getting for some time."

Support in City Had Been Expected .

Another commander, named Ali Hon- not negotiate beca dro, a soft-featured man with long fuzzy sideburns who appeared to be the senior man in the group, said that the offensive tion," Ali Hondro had not been given the expected popular have to do is have support in the capital and that a planned provide them with uprising in the countryside had been what is lengthenin

But they said ti hood of a negotiate that a Governmen a "masked strates the Government.
"If they really

past several months in an otherwise brutal and deadly historical saga. Because, as anyone who speaks Spanish-obviously not Schumacher-knows, one of the most common Spanish given names is Alejandro; in English, Alexander. Who knows how many readers of the New York Times wondered what this young man with an obviously Arabic name was doing in El Salvador; perhaps this was the PLO connection!

propaganda"—forged documents designed to discredit the group from which it is claimed they originate. A number of tricks have been employed in this document. In some cases the Spanish original is literally illegible—no translation can be rendered from the original, so the "translation" must be taken on faith. Other papers are innocuous until "interpreted" in the English "translation". Some are merely scratch paper with figures, and one must take on faith that the numbers refer to tons of guns. If they do, then the popular forces are much better armed than any other evidence indicates. One document is in Spanish script, and has notations on arms shipments typed into blank spaces in English and neatly underlined.

Other textual errors indicate that the document was hastily compiled and inadequately proofread. As one example, the military is referred to as "milicos" in the Spanish; the term is widely used in Chile but virtually unheard of in El Salvador. Also the use of commas and periods is inconsistent with Spanish usage. In Spanish large numbers are divided with a period, i.e., 10,000 would be written 10.000 in Spanish. In the document the style shifts back and forth, commas and periods being used interchangeably. These and other errors indicate that the "proof" is in its most significant parts a forgery, and a relatively crude one. A perceptive reader noted that the media's treatment of the document reminded him of Pascal: "I believe it because it is absurd."

On the surface, the allegations are implausible. By admission, the vast majority of weapons being used by the popular forces are of American manufacture. These weapons are available on the black market, and it is well established that the Salvadorans have been purchasing large quantities of weapons for more than a year, mainly in Costa Rica and Panama.

Shafik Handal, the alleged mastermind of the communist arms flow, issued a statement on February 26 denying the charges. Hewent on to raise the following questions: "Why were the supposed documents published first in New York and not in El Salvador? And why has the State Department rather than the fascist Christian Democratic junta assumed responsibility for their publication?"

The response of European leaders to this "evidence" has been decidedly cool, but the document was designed to play in Peoria, not Bonn or Paris. Significantly, shortly after this "proof" emerged, Reagan announced that his Ambassador to El Salvador would be Deane Hinton. Hinton served in Santiago, Chile from 1969 to 1971—the period of intense CIA black propaganda activity against the Allende government.

Reagan's Team: Terrorists Capture State Department

After picking Hinton for Ambassador, Reagan announced his choice for the key position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. In a move that stunned many observers, he chose a man who speaks no Spanish and has no background in Latin American affairs. Thomas Enders is the man, and his experience goes back to Kampuchea, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission from 1971 until 1974—while Nixon was conducting the "secret war," bombing Kampuchea while his officials denied before Congress—as well as the press—that this was happening.

Enders isn't the only Indochina veteran in the El Salvador team. The head of the Military Assistance Group in El Salvador is Col. Eldon Cummings, who was the chief military adviser to Gen. Vang Pao in Laos during the late sixties and early seventies. Vang Pao was the CIA's top man in its largest paramilitary operation to date, the use of the Hmong people as surrogate forces fighting another branch of the secret war in northern Laos.

Finally, it should be remembered that Secretary of State Alexander Haig went from Vietnam to become Kissinger's aide, and as such was intimately involved in the bloody campaign against the constitutional government of Chile, which began with the CIA's assassination of Chilean Army Chief of Staff Rene Schneider and continued till the death of Allende and thousands of patriotic Chileans at the hands of Gen. Pinochet. Haig's denunciation of terrorists should be viewed in the perspective of his campaign of terror against the people of Chile.

Duarte's "Popular" Government: Can This Mirage Be Saved?

The myth of land reform has been virtually played out. Shortly after Viera's murder, his successor Lionel Gomez fled the country after hiding in a Salvadoran slum while the deathsquad-military searched the neighborhood for him. He would have fled earlier if the government had agreed to allow the ISTA officials in the countryside to leave also, but again the necessity of preserving a facade of land reform required that no mass exodus of ISTA officials take place. In Washington Gomez talked openly of the failure of land reform, and expressed a desire to return to El Salvador and fight with the popular forces.

Virtually every ISTA official is now dead, in hiding, or in exile. Obviously a new lie is required to support the American policy. This time it is the notion that Duarte's ineffectual government is the choice of the Salvadoran people, who have lost any sympathy for the left they might once have possessed and are now being terrorized by a small band of fanatic communists. This claim is absurd on its face—the current president of the Democratic Revolutionary Front is Guillermo Ungo, a member of the first junta and a Social Democrat whose progressive position has won praise from international leaders such as Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme, and Lopez Portillo.

In fact, popular support of the left is great and increasing. In the January general offensive, the second largest city in El Salvador, Santa Ana, was taken by the popular forces when a contingent of over 160 soldiers joined the revolution and burned the army engineering school to the ground. Unprepared for this uprising, the popular forces were unable to hold Santa Ana; in their retreat they were joined by a string of people over two miles long and num-



An FMLN squad which annihilated a National Guard convoy at Santa Ana.

bering over 10,000.

Meanwhile, the right has been rushing to get its money out of the country. In December Duarte stated that there are "several rightwing groups which have taken \$1.2 billion, which represents three times the annual budget" out of the country. They have elected to fight from the safe haven of Miami, and to a lesser extent Guatemala City, financing the deathsquads from a safe distance.

The army is now demoralized, largely confined to its barracks in the major towns, and without offensive capabilities. What little activity it engages in is primarily blackmail of the peasants; a few hundred dollars a month will keep the members of a peasant co-op from being shot.

While the Salvadoran Army is pinned down in the major towns, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front has made great strides in creating unity and improving its battlefield tactics. Thanks to advanced radio communication equipment captured in the January offensive, the FMLN has the ability to coordinate military operations efficiently throughout the country. In the opinion of most observers, the next offensive, scheduled for May, should be successful in the absence of massive intervention by the U.S. or surrogate forces fighting as U.S. mercenaries. This view is shared by Reagan and his advisers, who have made El Salvador a high-profile issue at the risk of deflecting attention from the Reagan economic plan.

Conclusion

The extent of U.S involvement in El Salvador is increasing so fast that any figures mentioned at the time of this writing are likely to be outdated within a few weeks. Already there are over fifty, and possibly several hundred U.S. military personnel in El Salvador, including Army Special Forces "Green Berets" sent from the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama, designated by the administration as "technical advisers," to distinguish them from the "military advisers" we initially dispatched to

Vietnam. Total military aid in this calendar year will probably exceed \$35 million, the amount currently budgeted.

The Reagan administration is committed to "draw the line" in El Salvador. A difference of opinion exists as to how they will attempt to do this. One school of thought has been that the administration would finance and equip surrogate forces from the region, say from Guatemala and Honduras, or Venezuela and Chile. These forces could then be sent in under the guise of a hemispheric peacekeeping force, a move that would constitute a public relations coup for Reagan. The difficulty with this plan is getting the forces into the field in time. Guatemala has a reasonably competent army, but it is committed to fighting the growing insurgency there. Honduras has a weak army, though we are rushing roughly five million dollars of military aid to them; they are a poor choice for an intervention force because they fought El Salvador in the 1969 "soccer war" and would be about as popular in El Salvador as a German "peacekeeping force" would be in Paris. Venezuela has supported the junta in El Salvador publicly, but is unlikely to risk the condemnation of most of the world by sending in troops.

Even if a surrogate force could be recruited, it would take precious time. The Pentagon has been pushing for direct U.S. involvement for at least a year. Reagan's pronouncements and appointments point toward a policy of direct U.S. military intervention. The scenario seems clear: A few hundred "advisers" will be in place by May, and when the first one is shot, hundreds more will be sent to protect the first group. Before anyone can discuss the War Powers Act, once thought to have relevance in this type of situation, we will be in a full-scale shooting war again.



Civilians being harrassed by members of the Salvadoran Army.

As in the case of the early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the official troop figures may be considerably understated. CAIB spoke on March 23 with the father of one of the Green Berets now in El Salvador. He said his son is part of a 60-man reconnaissance team at Ft. Benning, Georgia. "He wouldn't be there without the other 59," he said. When asked how many U.S. "advisors" were really in



FMLN troops.

El Salvador, he suggested "at least 200." In any case, it seems highly unlikely that there are merely 50-plus U.S. soldiers in El Salvador at this time. FMLN spokespeople say that there are over 800 U.S. troops in El Salvador already.

Surrogate forces may play a part in the Reagan strategy, however. For the dirtiest work, including raids to Nicaragua, exiles from Cuba and former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard are likely to be employed. Already there are several hundred former Nicaraguan Guardsmen encamped on the Honduras-Nicaragua border staging raids into Nicaragua. Another group of possibly two hundred Nicaraguan exiles are fighting with the Salvadoran army and the private deathsquads. Together with the Cuban exile "secret army" which Reagan is reported to be reconstituting, this mercenary force represents a serious threat to the Nicaraguan revolution and to the aspirations of the people of Central America.

In the region-wide war that seems imminent there will be powerful forces opposed to U.S. intervention. Mexico is strongly against the U.S. policy of sending military aid and advisers, as is Panama. In Europe there is practically no support for the American policy, with the exception of Margaret Thatcher's conservative government in the U.K. Canadians demonstrated against U.S. intervention during Reagan's recent visit to that country.

Domestically, the Catholic Church has been in the forefront of opposition to the U.S. policy. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union voted in December to boycott military cargo for El Salvador, and they have been piling up on two docks in San Francisco since then, to the embarrassment of the administration. The White House is receiving hundreds of letters a week in protest of U.S. intervention—they are routinely forwarded to the State Department, where they pile up, many unopened.

On May 3, 1981, the largest anti-war march in half a decade will take place in Washington, sponsored by the People's Anti-War Organization and over 500 individuals and groups. Through fast and united action, we may be able to prevent the genocidal destruction of the Salvadoran people.

DEATHSQUADS:

THE REAL GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR

Deathsquads have their origins in the private armies that the large landholders have traditionally maintained to keep the peasants in line and to increase their own influence. These small private armies still exist, but the vast majority of murders and atrocities are now committed by nationwide organizations which enjoy close cooperation from the Army, often conducting joint operations with the Army, National Guard, and Treasury Police. They have no respect for the ruling junta, except as a vehicle for procuring U.S. aid. This was expressed at a news conference on May 22, 1980, when leaders of seven deathsquads announced that they were uniting into a rightwing army to "physically eliminate all leaders of the Salvadoran Communist Party. . . members of the government who back the Marxists, and all communists... In the junta and in the cabinet there are communists infiltrated preparing to take power." A number of officials of the first and second juntas have fled the country after receiving death threats, including Assistant Minister of Agriculture Jorge Alberto Villacorte Munoz and Lionel Gomez, who took over ISTA after Rodolfo Viera was killed.

The following are the principal deathsquads:

ORDEN: Organisation Democratica Nacionalista (Democratic Nationalist Organization)

ORDEN was founded by General Jose Alberto ("Chele") Medrano in 1968, the same year the AIFLD program founded UCS. Medrano has ties to the CIA going back to the early 1960s, and was a favored candidate of the U.S. in the 1972 elections. ORDEN's forces are said to number between 50,000 and 100,000, though these figures may be inflated to increase the organization's image of invincibility. From 1968 to 1979, ORDEN was an official branch of the military, and its members were authorized to carry arms, conduct searches, and generally act as they saw fit. The first junta attempted to abolish ORDEN with Decree Law 12, but the group was reconstructed by Medrano as the National Democratic Front.

A typical example of ORDEN's work is the massacre on July 9, 1980 of the residents of the village of Mogotes in La Libertad province, 20 miles from the capital. Thirty-one members of the Mojica Santos family were murdered, including fifteen children under the age of ten. Mothers were shot while

cradling their children in their arms, and then the children were shot. ORDEN also participated in the Sampol River massacre, where 600 peasants died, caught between ORDEN and the National Guard on one bank of the river, and the Honduran Army on the other. Young children were thrown into the air and used for target practice; women were raped and mutilated before finally being killed.

UGB: Union Guerrilla Blanca (White Warriors Union)

Headed by Roberto D'Aubuisson, this is probably the most political of all the deathsquads. D'Aubuisson was trained at the International Police Academy in Washington, and served under Gen. Romero as second in command of the intelligence system, where he supervised torture and is said to have personally carved dozens of people with a knife. Officially barred from entering the U.S., he travelled to this country in May of last year and met with many prominent Americans, including Roger Fontaine, who is now an advisor to Richard Allen, head of the National Security Council. D'Aubuisson claims to have close ties to the CIA, and says he met former Defense Intelligence Agency director Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham last May. Despite these associations, our sources believe that it was his group which executed Viera, Hammer, and Pearlman in the San Salvador Sheraton.

One of the White Warriors' first acts was to announce, in 1977, that all Jesuit priests who stayed in the country would be killed; at least seven Jesuits have been murdered since then, and many more have left the country.

Former Ambassador Robert White has called D'Aubuisson "a psychopathic killer."

FALANGE: Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Anticomunista-Guerra de Eliminacion (Armed Forces for Anticommunist Liberation-War of Elimination)

FALANGE is a mysterious deathsquad comprising both active and retired members of the security forces. One of its activities is the execution of soldiers who are suspected of sympathy for the popular forces, or who request leave—as it is known that many soldiers on leave never return to their units.

Junta Victims on the Streets of San Salvador





Deathsquad Victims Sadistically Mutilated





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Reagan Administration Links

With Guatemala's Terrorist Government

by Allan Nairn*

Local businessmen and government officials involved with Guatemala's notorious deathsquads say they have struck a deal with Ronald Reagan which provides for restoration of U.S. weapons sales and training facilities to the Guatemalan military and police, curtailment of State Department criticism of the Guatemalan regime's massive human rights violations, and the ultimate prospect of U.S. military intervention to shore up that beleaguered Central American government.

Before his election, Reagan met personally with two leading spokesmen of the Guatemalan right and also through a series of visits to the country by aides and associates conveyed the details of what one U.S. businessman calls his promised "180-degree turn" in U.S. policy toward Guatemala. These visits include one at the time of the Republican Convention to offer Reagan's "salute" to Guatemalan president General Romeo Lucas Garcia and inform him that "things were going to be changing."

High-level Guatemalan officials say that Reagan's assurances may already have led to an increase in the number of deathsquad assassinations and a senior leader of Guatemala's moderate Christian Democratic Party—already decimated by more than 34 assassinations of its top leadership in the last year—fears for his life.

The Campaign Connections

An ominous bargain has been struck by means of an extensive network of connections between the Reagan team and the Guatemalan extreme right, which include:

Junkets to Guatemala by a "who's-who" of the American New Right, sponsored by Guatemalan speculator and right-wing activist Roberto Alejos Arzu, who made his plantation available as a training site for participants in the CIA's Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Those along on one trip in April, 1980 for example, included top executives of Young Americans for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, Moral Majority, Young Republicans' National Federation, the American Conservative Union, Conservative Digest, and such right-wing activists as Howard Phillips of the

Conservative Caucus and John Laxalt, president of

 A spring, 1980 meeting in California between Reagan and Guatemalan hotel magnate Eduardo Carrette, the man whom General Lucas has asked to be his new ambassador to the U.S. and a leading figure in Amigos del Pais, a pressure group comprised of businessmen and landowners which Guatemala's recently-resigned Vice President Dr. Francisco Villagran Kramer has compared to the John Birch Society.

The now extremely active Amigos paid a hefty \$11,000 per month in retainer fees to Deaver and Hannaford, a Los Angeles-Washington, D.C. public relations firm headed by Reagan confidente Michael Deaver, which handled advertising for the Republican presidential campaign. Deaver is now White House Deputy Chief of Staff.

 Pressure on Congress by Reagan associates to "lend a sympathetic ear" to the Amigos' current lobbying campaign for the restoration of military aid and training for the Guatemalan military.

With an annual budget approaching a half million dollars that is being generously allocated for influencing U.S. public opinion, Amigos has hired several public relations and law firms including Washington-based Patton, Boggs and Blow, and Robert Brewster Clark, as well as Deaver and Hannaford to do the job.

The Deaver and Hannaford firm, whose ties to Reagan may have been an important reason for its selection, came under criticism in a recent Washington Post article for its possible violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act in failing to register within 10 days after it began working for the Amigos.

The association of Amigos del Pais also hosted the visit of a group of friendly U.S. Congressional staffers at the beginning of last year. One of the participants, Belden Bell, the coordinator of Reagan's 41-member foreign policy advisory committee, prepared a report for the Republican study committee outlining the forces that threaten Guatemala's stability. Bell concluded that "it is in the best interest of the United States, as well as Guatemala, to throw our national support behind this beleaguered country."

Reagan's shadow-campaign organization Citizens for the Republic, and brother of the Reagan campaign chairperson, Senator Paul Laxalt.

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Several other Reagan advisors have visited Guatemala in the past year, including Roger Fontaine, National Security Council assistant for Latin American affairs and retired Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, of his defense advisory committee, who also visited El Salvador for President Reagan. Another top aide to Fontaine's boss, NSC chief Richard Allen, visited Guatemala City just before the election.

Fontaine, who is an established hard-liner in regional matters, is the former director of Latin American Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, perhaps the nation's most conservative academic-activists center for Latin American affairs. He bolstered Guatemalan hopes in an interview published in the *Miami Herald* this past July where he was quoted as saying, "It's pretty clear that Guatemalans will be given what aid they need in order to defend themselves against an armed minority which is aided and abetted by Cubans."



Roger Fontaine

- Comments by Reagan advisors in defense of "death-squad" activities.
- And campaign contributions—solicited by the Reagan staff—from American businessmen and landowners in Guatemala. While in Guatemala there were repeated references by high Guatemalan government and financial figures of illegal contributions from Guatemalan citizens being funneled to the Reagan campaign through a California entity.

The Deathsquads

Guatemala's deathsquads with such names as "Secret Anti-Communist Army" and "Eye for an Eye" specialize in "disappearances" of their political opponents, routine torture, and high-noon machine-gun executions in downtown Guatemala City as well as the country's outlying provinces.

The victims are typically students, priests, labor leaders, journalists, teachers, peasant activists and members and

leaders of moderate opposition parties such as the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Parties—all perceived to be "communists" by the ultra-right, who define basic reforms—social and economic—as an irreversible step towards Moscow.

The daily body counts have been estimated at 30 or 40, although one report recently received from a hospital morgue suggests the figure may be at least twice as high.

Guatemalan government spokesmen have blamed the violence on clashes between extremist right and left-wing groups operating entirely out of the government's control.

Sources close to the Lucas Garcia regime report, however, that the deathsquads are staffed and directed by the Guatemalan Army and Police under the command of President Lucas, Interior Minister Donald Alvarez Ruiz, and a group of top-ranking generals, with the assistance of Lucas's right-hand man, Colonel Hector Montalban, and national Chief of Police, Colonel German Chupina. Private businessmen provide the payrolls for the squads, and often assist in "compiling" the lists of troublesome labor, professional and political leaders as well as other suggested victims.

Cotton grower Raul Garcia Granados—a leader of the Guatemalan right who is the brother of Lucas's Chief of Staff and co-owner with Lucas of an estate in the northern Franja Transversal region—traces the lineage of the current deathsquads back through four administrations to the late 1960s.

"Of course when they were organized, they were organized under the patronage and the approval of the government and the army," he said in a transcribed interview. "They have lists of people that are suspected to be communists of whatever kind, and they kill them. It's a war, you see, a war between the communists and the anticommunists. They [the deathsquads] have the sympathy of most of the Guatemalan people."

One U.S. businessman who in the past has worked with the CIA in bringing about the 1954 coup which launched Guatemala's current succession of right-wing military governments, boasts of being shown Colonel Chupina's files on union members and political leaders from which the names of victims are drawn for compilation into death-squad "hit lists".

Government control of the deathsquads, long an open secret in the top echelons of Guatemalan society, was exposed this September in devastating detail by a man who served for four years as one of the regime's chief apologists.

Elias Barahona, former press secretary to Interior Minister Alvarez Ruiz, who controls the national police, fled the country, declared he had become a member of the EGP (Ejercito Guerrillero del Pueblo) an anti-government guerrilla group, and in a Panama City press conference issued a 15-page statement detailing how Lucas and the generals run the deathsquads from the fourth floor of the National Palace Annex. He listed the addresses of houses

used by the government for detention and torture of its kidnap victims.

Although the Guatemalan authorities attempted to deny this report, Barahona's credibility was inadvertently confirmed in October when Lucas's Chief of Staff, Jorge Garcia Granados, said in the writer's conversation with him, that the Interior Minister had in fact taken Barahona into his confidence after receiving accurate information from him about the guerrilla movement.

Vinicio Cerezo, Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Party, told a COHA press conference the same month that last June, his party leadership was told by a high Guatemalan military officer it was being placed on the death list because "if you are against the government, you are a communist."

In February 1981, Amnesty International released an extensive report on massive human rights violations in Guatemala, attributing nearly 6,000 deaths to the Lucas Garcia government in less than three years. The victims include trade union leaders, teachers, university students, peasant community leaders, and Catholic clergymen and social workers.

Despite such mounting evidence, and the near-universal recognition that Guatemala is one of the worst human rights violators in the entire world, both Arano Osorio, known as "the butcher of Zacape," and former Guatemalan vice-president Mario Sandoval Alarcon, generally considered high commander of the deathsquads, were invited to the Reagan inauguration.



Sandoval and Friends

Guatemala and the Carter Administration

To the Lucas regime and the businessmen who support it, President Carter's human rights policy was anathema. Lucas called Carter "Jimmy Castro." Feeling increasingly isolated and betrayed by Carter State Department policy in Guatemala, officials there chose to ignore Washington's urgings that human rights violations be corrected.

Even before the current government took office, Guatemalan officials rejected military aid in 1977 in protest over the Carter administration's criticism of its human rights record. Explaining this move, a Guatemalan recently told a foreign visitor "the U.S. has encouraged communist takeovers in Nicaragua and El Salvador. They won't do the same here."

Businessman Roberto Alejos complained: "Most of the elements in the State Department are probably procommunist—they're using human rights as an argument to promote the socialization of these areas. We've gotten to the point now where we fear the State Department more than we fear communist infiltration. Either Mr. Carter is a totally incapable president or he is definitely a procommunist element."

Guatemala's former ambassador to Washington, Julio Asencio Wunderlich, in a speech to the Guatemalan Managers Association last summer said: 'These circumstances that we feel and live in in Guatemala have led us to place our highest hopes in the possibility of change in the U.S. policy with a change in the administration."

Hopes for Reagan

Stung by the U.S. arms cutoff and human rights criticism—which has hurt tourism as well as the nation's overall image abroad—and anticipating an upsurge in popular unrest in the coming year, Guatemalan rightists look to Ronald Reagan as their chance to cling to power. They are particularly alarmed over the prospect that the decision by the 1.8-million member National Education Association to move ahead on the tourism blockade of the country will even further damage that faltering industry.

Milton Molina is a wealthy plantation owner who is reputed within Guatemala to have funded and ordered deathsquad attacks on dozens of peasants and workers. When asked about the squads in a transcribed interview, Molina replied, "Well, we have to do something, don't you think so?" Molina says he and his friends back Reagan "one hundred percent."

One American executive who boasts of collaborating with Colonel Chupina says bluntly: "Why should we be worried about the death squads? They're bumping off the Commies, our enemies! I'd give 'em more power. Hell, I'd get some cartridges if I could, and everyone else would too ...Why should we criticize them? The deathsquad? I'm for it!" This businessman solicited contributions for the Reagan campaign among his colleagues in Guatemala City and traveled to the U.S. to lobby on behalf of the Lucas government.

The deathsquads' defenders base their faith in Reagan on direct conversations with him and his top military and foreign policy advisors. According to the Reagan fundraiser quoted above, Reagan told ambassador-to-be Carrette, "Hang in 'til we get there. We'll get in and then we'll give you help. Don't give up. Stay there and fight. I'll help you as soon as I get in."

The Guatemalan Lobby

The Reagan camp's courtship of the Guatemalan right began in earnest with the December, 1979 visit to Guatemala of a delegation from the American Security Council, a private, ultra-hawk U.S. military lobby. One of the consultants on Guatemalan affairs for the ASC film "Attack on the Americas" [see article in this issue] was John C. Trotter, the notorious manager of Guatemala City's Coca-Cola bottling plant franchise. Trotter has been implicated in the deathsquad murders of a number of workers and union leaders at the bottling plant and was removed from management by Coca-Cola headquarters after an international union and church-led boycott of Coke protesting the situation at the plant in Guatemala.

Trotter is also a director of the Guatemala Freedom Foundation, a pro-Lucas international lobby group founded by Roberto Alejos, which is more extreme than the Amigos del Pais organization.

Alejos hosted the ASC delegation and helped set up an itinerary which included visits with President Lucas and the Guatemalan military high command, helicopter tours to inspect rural counter-insurgency activities, and a cocktail party with Guatemalan businessmen at Alejos's estate.

The delegation was headed by two Reagan associates—retired General John K. Singlaub who has served as the ASC's Director of Education, and Daniel Graham, the former Defense Intelligence Agency head, who maintains an office at ASC's Washington, DC headquarters.

As an advisor to Reagan, Graham retains his position as co-chairperson for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, a Washington lobby composed of retired military personnel pushing for a larger defense budget. The Missouri branch of the Coalition met with Guatemalan and El Salvadoran business and political leaders in St. Louis last May. Among the Guatemalan visitors were Manuel Ayau and Roberto Alejos. Ayau is a member of his nation's most ultra-conservative party, the National Liberation Movement, which allegedly is directly linked to paramilitary deathsquads freely operating in the country. He generally is considred to be the ideologue of the more extremist sector of the business community, and is also on the board of GFF.

Alejos and Ayau are now well-known figures in Washington. On trips to that city, their highly-paid public relations aides have arranged for them to meet with Congressional staff and State Department officials in the hopes of enlisting support for their poitical position.

Public Relations

Their publicity is handled primarily by MacKenzie, McCheyne, Inc. of Washington, D.C. This firm received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Somoza gov-

ernment of Nicaragua for, among other things, running the so-called Nicaraguan Government Information Service. It also promotes the El Salvador Freedom Foundation, which purports to be to the right of the Salvadoran junta, and it openly arranged the April 1980 Washington press conference given by Roberto D'Aubuisson. In the past two years, MacKenzie, McCheyne has received over \$250,000 from the GFF.

These Guatemalan emissaries are known to have been heartened to hear Gen. Graham's statement, made during a trip to Argentina last year, that "Carter's human rights policy has had disastrous effects on America's relations with Latin America... and if Reagan is elected, the U.S. would abandon the policy of throwing old friends to the wolves."

Singlaub, the former commander of U.S. forces in South Korea dismissed by President Carter for insubordination, has good contacts with the informal network of radical right-wing mercenaries who aid dictatorships around the globe. Last spring, Singlaub was seen lecturing—wearing a Reagan button—at "The Farm," the Powder Springs, Georgia para-military training school of legendary mercenary and gunrunner, Mitchell Werbell, III.

In a tape-recorded interview last August, Singlaub said that he was "terribly impressed" at how the Lucas regime was "desperately trying to promote human rights" and lamented the fact that "as the [Guatemalan] government loses support from the United States, it gives the impression to the people that there's something wrong with their government." Singlaub urged sympathetic understanding of the deathsquads, arguing that the Carter administration's unwillingness to back the Lucas regime in its elimination of its enemies was "prompting those who are dedicated to retaining the free enterprise system and to continuing their progress toward political and economic development to take matters in their own hands."

As for Graham, he acknowledged during a Washington telephone interview last year that he told President Lucas Garcia that on his return to the United States, he would urge the Reagan campaign team to provide for the resumption of military training and aid to Guatemala as soon as a victorious Reagan would be installed in office.

In private conversations, the Reagan advisors were even more blunt. One high Guatemalan official who met with Singlaub and Graham, and who later discussed the implications of the visit with his government and military collegues, said that the message was clear. First, "Mr. Reagan recognizes that a good deal of dirty work has to be done."

The Reagan aides' advice and supportive comments were the talk of official Guatemala for days after their visit. Within weeks, deathsquad assassinations increased dramatically and there was talk in government circles of even harsher measures. "In private they say all the time that they're going to find changes in the United States policies," says one Guatemalan who meets regularly with government and business leaders. "I am sure that if they feel they are more safe, they are going to try to eliminate all opposition in the country."

The parade of visiting advisors continued. Roger Fontaine made at least two trips to Guatemala. Fontaine is on a first-name basis with right-wing figures and keeps in constant touch with them by telephone.

Gene Friedman, former Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, and whose bias in favor of the Guatemalan government is hardly concealed, was one of the priority people to see in Washington in itineraries arranged by one of the five or six Washington law and public relations firms working for Guatemalan right-wing entities. In June 1980, an Amigos delegation came to Washington and hosted a dinner for Friedman even though another subcommittee aide refused to attend given the nature of the hosts. Friedman later attempted to stonewall the holding of another round of hearings which would listen to opponents of the Guatemalan regime until four out of the five Democratic members demanded the hearings in a letter to Friedman's boss, Congressman Gus Yatron (Dem.-Pa.).

Through the Amigos del Pais and Alejos's and Trotter's Guatemala Freedom Foundation, a number of Guatemalans also came to the U.S. to meet Reagan and his staff. Both Amigos del Pais director Maegli, and Manuel Ayau, chief ideologue and theorist of the Guatemalan right, have conferred with Richard Allen, Reagan's National Security Council head. Early last year, Alejos met with Reagan personally in California.

"Mr. Reagan was in favor of human rights as much as we were," Alejos says. "We found in Mr. Reagan a more responsible attitude from a country that will work with us on a basis of respect. . .I have personal respect and great admiration for Mr. Reagan. I think your country needs him." Through all of these meetings the same understanding emerged: the Guatemalan rightists and the Reagan advisors found they shared the same views and had little need to negotiate. "With the people we're talking to in the Reagan administration," says Maegli, "we don't have anything to discuss."

The Deal With Reagan

As described by Guatemalan and U.S. businessmen and Guatemalan government officials, the bargain with the Reagan forces has four key elements. First, there is an agreement, as Maegli puts it, "to take our Army off the blacklist"—to restore weapons and ammunition sales, supply badly needed spare parts for the U.S.-built helicopters, and make available fighter and cargo planes to the Guatemalan air force as well as crowd control and counterinsurgency gear to the army and police.

This promise is already in the works. Speaking in Miami in early March, Guatemalan vice-president Col. Oscar Mendoza said that his government "feels more tranquil now." Acting Assistant Secretary of State John Bushnell indicated at the same time that the arms flow to Guatemala might resume soon. Jack Anderson reported that President Reagan has already decided the Guatemalan regime should get U.S. help.

Under the administration's proposal for a \$4 billion foreign military cash sale credit fund and a \$500 million general economic support fund, it is possible that military assistance to Guatemala could be given without any Congressional review. This concern is so serious that, on March 4, several Members of Congress introduced a resolution calling on the Reagan administration to continue the arms embargo now in effect against Guatemala. The chances of passage in the conservative Congress are slight. (The embargo has, in fact, only been partial. In 1979 and 1980, Guatemala was able to purchase \$1.4 million in military equipment from the U.S.)

Second, a commitment has been made to resume Pentagon training of the army and police, particularly in surveillance, intelligence and interrogation techniques. According to Robert Merrick, an American-born plantation owner who was in close touch with Reagan advisors, Fontaine promised him and a group of Guatemalan businessmen that Reagan "would do everything he could within the law to help train the Guatemalan police."

Third and perhaps most importantly, the Reagan supporters have agreed to cut back U.S. criticism of the deathsquads which the Guatemalan regime feels has so tarnished its international political and financial standing. "We understand that as soon as Reagan changes this attitude," says Raul Garcia Granados, who has met with Fontaine and other Reagan insiders, "we won't get the pressure that we have from certain groups right now."

Garcia Granados says that while Fontaine explained that human rights laws are already on the books and would have to be honored in principle by Reagan, the Reagan administration would do everything it could to see that they did not work to the political, military or economic detriment of the Lucas regime. "They don't approve of the way that Carter... was getting involved in all these matters because of human rights," he said.

One former high Guatemalan official, now in exile, says his former colleagues have been assured by the Reagan people that the deathsquads will be able to operate without adverse presssure from the White House or the State Department: "They have the feeling that Mr. Reagan would not denounce them and would not make it a moral issue."

Finally, although the signals have been less explicit, there is also the expectation in Guatemalan government and business councils that President Reagan would intervene militarily in the event that a popular uprising threatened the Lucas government. "That's my feeling," says Chief of Staff Jorge Garcia Granados, Raul's brother, "because of the kind of person Mr. Reagan is."

In anticipation of such support, businessmen who back the deathsquads gave their all for the Reagan campaign. In addition to the more than \$120,000 which Amigos del Pais paid to the Deaver and Hannaford firm, other public relations efforts by right-wing Guatemalan groups attempted to sway U.S. opinion concerning Central America, in Reagan's favor.

In the first six months of 1980, the Alejos-Trotter Guatemala Freedom Foundation paid \$35,000 to MacKenzie, McCheyne in exchange for services which, according to the Justice Department Foreign Agent disclosure form, consisted of issuing one press release, holding one press conference and distributing some news clippings at a cost of \$8,071.06. According to Alejos, however, the Foundation's U.S. activities also included developing and distributing Central America-related "propaganda" on behalf of the Reagan campaign.

According to Merrick and others, American businessmen based in Guatemala gave heavily to the Reagan campaign. Yet a check of the names of more than 200 such individuals—including several who said specifically that

Human Rights in Guatemala

On March 4, 1981, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington, D.C. issued a report on human rights violations in Guatemala. It concluded that Guatemala was, along with El Salvador, the worst human rights violator in the Western Hemisphere, noting that political murders have escalated to more than 20 per day.

Most of the violence, the report states, is directly attributable to the deathsquads. Primary victims include: political leaders of opposing parties, including the Director of the United Revolutionary Front and leaders of the Social Democratic Party; journalists, fifteen of whom were assassinated during 1980, while eighty more were driven out of the country; teachers, more than 100 of whom were killed in 1980; students, more than 200 of whom have been murdered; labor union leaders, hundreds of whom have been arrested, tortured and murdered; Jesuits and other Catholic Church leaders, many of whom have been harrassed, threatened and killed; and Indian peasants, who have been the victims of massacres throughout the country.

The report concludes: "In the name of anti-communism, the military regime, together with a number of prominent politicians, businessmen and military officers, is attempting to destroy all democratic sectors, including moderate political parties, trade unions, peasant organizations, the autonomous university, and religious groups, in order to maintain their privileged position. The magnitude of carnage and senseless destruction is incomprehensible. The Lucas Garcia dictatorship is a terrorist government which is violently repressing all dissent and rejecting all legal and peaceful means to solve Guatemala's serious social and economic problems."

Most disturbingly, the report notes, the pattern of violence and repression throughout the country has noticeably escalated since the Reagan election victory, including flagrant deathsquad activity. they had contributed— against the list of Reagan donors disclosed to the Federal Election Commission, showed no public trace of any such contributions. The sole exception was John Trotter, who through his wife had given \$750 to the Reagan primary campaign. One businessman who was solicited by the Reagan campaign said explicit instructions were given repeatedly: "Do not give to Mr. Reagan's campaign directly." Monies were directed instead to an undisclosed committee in California.

Reagan himself was reportedly aware of the potential of the Guatemalan connection. One businessman tells the story of the wife of an Amigos del Pais board member who attended a California fund-raising party with Reagan. "He was standing there. . .She said, 'I represent 14,000 Americans in Guatemala,' and Reagan turned around and said, 'Get that woman's name!"

There is no apparent reason why the Reagan campaign wished to avoid public disclosure of contributions from American citizens living in Guatemala, since these are perfectly legal. The much more serious allegation concerns campaign contributions from Guatemalan citizens, which are prohibited under U.S. law. Merrick, an ardent Reagan supporter, said of his fellow businessmen: "They're laying their money out, and I would say that the Guatemalans are the ones who are really laying it out. . .I do know that they are giving very heavily."

One government official tells of a meeting in the National Palace in Guatemala City where Guatemalan businessmen and government members boasted of funneling money to Reagan but cautioned all listening that the connection was to be kept confidential.

Even before coming to power, the Reagan forces made efforts on behalf of the Guatemalan regime. Last springwhen the Amigos del Pais were making the rounds of Congress asking for restoration of the roughly \$250,000 Guatemalan military training appropriation to the federal budget—Nancy Reynolds, Nancy Reagan's former press secretary and the current Vice President for public relations of the Bendix Corporation (which has no plants in Guatemala), called the office of Congressman Don Pease (Dem.-Ohio), who is from a district where Bendix has a major plant and asked that he "lend a sympathetic ear" to Amigos del Pais members' plea for aid. "It's the first time we ever got a phone call like that," said the congressman's aide. "It's unusual in that an official company representative usually doesn't call on unofficial business." It was Nancy Reynolds who recommended Deaver and Hannaford to Amigos del Pais.

A number of Reagan advisers have openly defended the deathsquads and the Lucas government. Retired General Gordon Sumner, former head of the Central American Command and one of Reagan's top military advisors, said flatly in a press interview last August: "The policy of the Carter administration is to destabilize the Lucas government, and there's no excuse for it. That is a government that was elected by the people." Sumner also defends the deathsquads, arguing that though the need for such units is regrettable, "there is really no other choice."

"Attack on the Americas" A Critique

by Philip Wheaton*

"Attack on the Americas" is a 25-minute 16 mm. color film produced by the American Security Council Foundation for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. It presents, relatively slickly, an extreme right-wing view of political developments in the Caribbean and Central America. Its themes are pure cold war paranoia: that the Soviet Union is on the verge of taking over the world, that in Latin America Cuba is doing this work for the Soviet Union, and that the United States may in the very near future face communist troops on the Rio Grande.


The film, which uses extensive TV network footage, cost upwards of \$1 million to make, and a greater amount is being budgeted for showings around the country, on local TV stations, in public schools, and before civic and community groups. While some progressive viewers of the film have dismissed it as obvious, even ham-handed propaganda which will fool no one, others are seriously concerned that it will in fact present a believable, though completely false, picture of events in the Caribbean basin.

Philip Wheaton, the Director of EPICA, prepared the following brief analysis of some of the major distortions and falsehoods in this film. There are grass-roots campaigns around the United States to prevent the showing of this film, particularly under any governmental auspices, and to fight, when the film is shown, for equal time to present the truth. This information may be helpful to those involved in that struggle. For further information, readers should contact the following groups which are engaged in this struggle: CISPES, P.O. Box 12056, Washington, DC 20005; EPICA, 1470 Irving Street, NW, Washington, DC 20010; Center for Constitutional Rights, 853 Broadway, New York, NY 10003.

Who Produced the Film? The film is initially suspect because it was produced by an offshoot of the American Security Council, an ultra-right, anti-communist organization about which is has been said: "It doesn't merely have representatives of the military-industrial complex on its board; it is the military-industrial complex." The film is the fourth in a series of reactionary documentaries produced by the Foundation, others of which have been strongly criticized by both liberals and conservatives as "inaccurate" and "distorted." Regarding this film, there are reports that members of the Salvadoran oligarchy now residing in Miami contributed large sums of money to help finance it.

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What is the Basic Message? The film has a double message. First and foremost it is a rhetorical, red-baiting warning against a supposed intentional strategy of the Soviet Union to take over the Caribbean basin and to march inexorably northward, through Central America, country by country, until they are at the U.S. border. Thus, the Americas are "under siege," and through Cuban intervention the Soviet Union intends to "slash the Americas in half." The second message is an attack on the Carter human rights philosophy as naive. The film shows, with disdain, Carter stating in a speech that "We are now free of that inordinate fear of communism," and criticizes



Carter for applying sanctions to our "friends" like Somoza, while allowing Cuban arms to be used by the Sandinistas. Jeane Kirkpatrick, now U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and one of the stars of the film, says scornfully that the Carter "doctrine of social change has been embraced like a religious dogma," while it only favored the Cubans and the Soviets.

What is the Primary Distortion? There is no analysis whatsoever in the film of the social inequities as the cause of the social upheavals in Central America and the Caribbean, nor is there any recognition that these inequities are due to the oppressive and exploitative role of the ruling class in specific countries. The film criticizes Carter, and especially former Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher for associating their administration with "peaceful, evolutionary, non-violent change," by the device of showing on film, as these words are being spoken, a group of guerrillas walking through a field with bandanas over their faces. Moreover, on several occasions when the film's sound-track speaks of violence of the left, the screen shows the dead victims of right-wing violence. The film insists that the problem in the region is terrorism and communism, not the ruling oligarchies and their fascist militaries.

Left Linkage Distortions. The film identifies every liberation struggle in the region as Cuban-based, as following the "Cuban model," or as being forced into the Cuban mold. It falsely claims that Cuba trained and armed each of the struggles, in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in Guatemala. Grenada, the film states, is "now a classic example of the Cuban model." The Soviets and the Cubans are continually linked. The Soviet plan is to "get at the U.S. by moving into the very socially, economically and politically troubled areas of the Caribbean basin, using them as a base. . . . "The Soviets' "ultimate goal of world domination" uses Cuban troops as its proxies throughout Latin America.

Footnote Distortions. The text of the film comes with extensive footnotes which should be carefully examined by anyone critiquing the film. The footnotes are usually legitimate, but often do not prove the text which they are intended to support. Documentation is distorted in two ways. First, while the figures may be accurate, the meaning is distorted. Thus the narrator states that there are "two thousand Cuban advisors known to be in Nicaragua, including military advisors and experts in security, communications and intelligence." This gives the impression that most, if not all, of these 2,000 are in the stated fields, but the footnote quotes a CIA analyst who states that, of the 2,000, "1,200 are teachers, 300 medics, over 200 construction workers, plus advisors working in agriculture, fisheries." Secondly, the film uses certain facts out of their historical context. For example, when it speaks of 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola, it does not explain that until the South African troops, supported by the U.S. and CIAfunded mercenaries, invaded Angola through Namibia and were within 50 miles of the capital, the Cubans had only 20 advisors in all of Angola. Only then were they asked by the Angolans to provide military assistance and troops.



Visual Geo-Political Distortions. The film makes extensive use of maps in reinforcing its message, but in the process distorts geographic or geo-political reality. For instance, General Gordon Sumner, ASC leader and another star of the film, uses the volatile issue of oil and energy supplies to the U.S., referring to the so-called "choke points" which Cuba could allegedly cut off: the Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, and the Panama Canal. Putting aside the feat of imagination required to envision such Cuban military successes, the film does not point out that Mexican and Guatemalan oil would not be affected by these "choke points" and that Venezuelan and Trinidadian oil could easily avoid them. The film also uses maps to emphasize the communist threat, with throbbing bull's-eyes in each country as it turns red, including, at the end, the United States.

The Juxtaposition Technique. At various points the film juxtaposes certain factual truths with propaganda statements preceding and following the factual matter, suggesting a relationship which has no basis in fact. Thus, the extremely high death rate and extensive damage which occurred in Nicaragua-most of it from Somoza's bombing and National Guard slaughters—is shown in between a reference to Nicaragua doing "nothing without checking with Cuba" and a statement that "when a society loses its freedom to communism, everyday life is transformed." The implication, of course, is that "the revolution" was the cause of the carnage. In another example, pictures of the Cuban construction workers helping to buld the international airport in Grenada are preceded by a statement that Cubans are training the Grenadian army and followed by a statement that the airfield could be used by Soviet or Cuban planes.

Switching the Blame from Fascism to Communism. The entire film places the blame for all problems on the threat of communism, not on the reality of fascism, as exemplified by Somoza's Nicaragua and today's El Salvador and Guatemala. While military and paramilitary forces in Guatemala and El Salvador systematically rape, torture and murder, creating a state of siege in their own countries, the film glibly asserts the opposite, that the countries are in a state of siege because they did not meet the Carter administration's impractical human rights criteria, did not get the U.S. military aid they needed, could not stop the communists.

MOZAMBIQUE SMASHES SPY NETWORK

Expels CIA Officers Who Aided in ANC Killings

By Ellen Ray

With the complicity of a U.S. media blackout, the CIA has once again managed to deflect attention from its criminal operations—in this case the exposure in Mozambique in early March of one of the largest and most sinister spy rings ever uncovered.

The joint operations of the CIA and South African intelligence, the Department of National Security (DONS, formerly BOSS) were directed against progressive African governments for a period of more than six years, according to a March 4 communique from the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities extended throughout southern Africa, and from Pretoria to Washington. "The CIA had initiated espionage activities and recruitment of agents during the colonial era," the communique states. After Mozambican independence in 1975, the spy ring was directed from the U.S. Embassy in Maputo, the Mozambican capital, by the successive CIA Chiefs of Station posing as second secretaries.

Involvement in Mass Murder

Announcing the expulsion of six American CIA officers and agents, Mozambique's Ministry of Security produced a double agent, a young Air Force officer, who had infiltrated the network since 1978. According to his testimony and that of other Mozambican officials who confessed to involvement, the ring did not serve merely to gather intelligence information, but was actively engaged in subversion and interference in Mozambique's internal affairs

The most blatant current example given was the direct involvement of the CIA with South Africa in the January 30 raid in which twelve members of the African National Congress were murdered and three others kidnapped and taken to South Africa. [See sidebar.] Evidence indicates that the CIA provided the addresses of the three homes in the Maputo suburb of Matola where the South African exiles were living. With this information, South African commandos crossed the border near Swaziland, drove some 50 miles to Matola, and attacked the homes.

Prior to the liberation of Zimbabwe, it was learned, the CIA network had also collected information on the location of Robert Mugabe's ZANU refugee camps in Mozambique, and transmitted this information to the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, leading to repeated raids

against Mozambican territory.

The Expulsions

In retaliation for the latest and most vicious raid, the government of Mozambique expelled six Americans and arrested at least twenty other persons, both foreigners and Mozambicans, including Jose Massinga, a former director of research and personnel in the Foreign Ministry. Massinga confessed to having been recruited by the CIA while attending university in the United States. He was activated to work against his government in 1975, and continued until his arrest on March 2. Another CIA agent arrested in connection with the smashing of this ring was Alcide Chivite, a veteran FRELIMO guerrilla leader, who has publicly detailed his work with the spy ring since 1978. Additionally, a number of Mozambican military officers have been arrested. President Samora Machel has, in several addresses to the people of Mozambique, urged far greater vigilance on the part of everyone, and criticized the relaxation of security which came with the victory of the progressive forces in Zimbabwe.

According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), the CIA operatives expelled on March 4 were:

- Frederick Boyce Lundahl. Deputy Chief of Station for the CIA in Lusaka, Zambia prior to his posting to Maputo in June 1980. He was Chief of Station in Maputo, listed as Second Secretary.
- Louis Leon Ollivier, Deputy Chief of Station; also listed as Second Secretary. Ollivier was known to have participated in a CIA officer's course in Washington in 1975.
- Arthur F. Russell, telecommunications specialist at the Maputo station.
- Patricia Russell, wife of Arthur Russell and a secretary in the CIA station posted to the political section of the Embassy.
- Karen Lundahl, wife of Frederick Lundahl, and Ginger Lee Ollivier, wife of Louis Ollivier, though not official Embassy personnel, were also ordered to leave the country because they took part in CIA support operations.





AP Photos of "Unidentified" Expellees Departing

In addition to those expelled, the AIM release listed a number of other CIA officers and agents who had worked in Mozambique in the past years. These included: James Douglas Smith, Jr., Lundahl's predecessor as Chief of Station, who had been involved in the CIA's ill-fated intervention in Angola in 1975, and his wife, Barbara Smith, also a CIA collaborator. Frederick Wettering, Smith's predecessor, who was Chief of Station from 1975 to mid-1977. Wettering, who had previously served in Salisbury, Zanzibar, and Nairobi, was, like those who succeeded him, listed as Second Secretary. Shirley Smith. posing as a secretary in the Embassy's political section from mid-1977 to 1980, had served the CIA in Sao Paulo, Luanda, Lisbon, Vienna, and Lagos. It was noted that she had used sexual provocations in attempts to recruit agents. Walter Caetano D'Andrade, was a CIA specialist in recruiting informers, who had visited Maputo in 1975 for that purpose. Shirley Tegro, an experienced CIA officer was listed as political secretary at the Maputo Embassy in June and July 1980. She had served earlier in Phnom Penh, Saigon, Brasilia, and Lagos. Jimmy Kolker, was a CIA officer who served in Maputo from 1977 to 1979. Subsequently he was an assistant to the Undersecretary of State for African Affairs; currently he is listed as First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Salisbury, Zimbabwe.

The Smokescreen

Responding immediately to the expulsions, the U.S. State Department charged that the orders for the U.S. personnel to leave came after a Cuban intelligence team with Mozambican support had tried to recruit one of the CIA officers and failed. The State Department also alleged that three CAIB co-editors who had visited Mozambique were involved. The State Department stated it was "not coincidental" that the CAIB people were there "at the time," and that the incident was viewed "with the most serious concern."

The CAIB co-editors, Ellen Ray, Bill Schaap, and Louis Wolf, issued a statement pointing out that they had been in Maputo some weeks before the alleged incident, but had nothing to do with it. They pointed out that the State Department's reaction was nothing but a smokescreen to deflect attention from the serious underlying charges that the U.S. government, through the CIA, shared the responsibility for the mass murder of the ANC exiles.

The State Department, questioned about the CAIB statement, refused to comment. The colloquy at the State Department daily press briefing on March 5 relating to the charges of CIA interference was enlightening:

- Q. Are you prepared to say on the record that none of these four was in fact involved in intelligence or subversion?
- A. We don't comment on such matters regardless of the source of the charge. Whether it comes from Mozambique, Cuba, or the Soviet Union, wherever, we don't comment.
- Q. Were any of them employed by the CIA?
- A. They were all officers. With the exception of the two wives, they were all officers in the embassy, and the two wives, I believe, were working wives; they were secretaries.
- Q. Were they Foreign Service Officers?
- A. They were Foreign Service, yes.
- Q. Not Reserve?
- A. This I don't know.

This last exchange related to the fact first publicly noted in the John Marks article, "How to Spot a Spook," that most CIA officers under diplomatic cover do not have Foreign Service Officer (FSO) ratings, but rather Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) or Foreign Service Staff (FSS) ratings.

Mozambican authorities, in fact, criticized U.S. attempts to present Mozambique as subservient to any outside forces. The claim of "Cuban and private American involvement was intended to convey that Mozambicans were incapable of exposing the spy ring. That's racist," a Mozambican official said.

The News Blackout

Since the initial flurry of press statements about Cuba and CAIB, there has been a virtual news blackout on the developments in Mozambique. Nevertheless, investigations into the spy ring continue there. At a recent press conference in Maputo, attended by more than 100 foreign reporters and diplomats, Flight Captain Joao Carneiro Goncalves described how he duped the CIA for more than three years by passing on false information provided to him by the Ministry of Security. The CIA was apparently interested in obtaining information on the Mozambican armed forces, on liberation movements which had representatives in that country, and, ominously, on the movements of President Samora Machel.

A pilot, Jose Gomes Neto, whom Frederick Lundahl personally tried to recruit, described the methods used. Lundahl, a trained pilot and parachutist, and his predecessor James Douglas Smith, had joined the Mozambique Aero-Club and took part in various competitions. They made use of such occasions to take photographs of sensitive areas. Lundahl used the excuse of flying from Maputo to Inhambane in the north for a parachute competition to make an aerial survey of areas near both cities. Determined to recruit Gomes Neto, Lundahl tried to pass himself off as a representative of the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, and invited Gomes Neto sailing on his yacht, playing squash at his club, and the like. The information Lundahl was trying to obtain included the identity of the flight staff which travelled with President Machel; the flights scheduled for the President and other civilian and military leaders; the security systems at Mozambican airports, particularly the stationing of security forces at Maputo airport; the quantity of spare aircraft parts in stock; the structure of Mozambican Airways workshops; and the identities of the main aircraft mechanics. The Maputo daily, Noticias, commented that the case of Jose Gomes Neto illustrates how the CIA uses social contacts to try to recruit agents, to lead them into illegal and subversive activities.

Africa News reported that one American student who knew Lundahl when he was in Lusaka recalled the following: "They flew around each weekend, and we always thought it a bit strange." He went on to describe an incident when one member of Lundahl's club was killed when his plane was shot down by Zimbabwean guerrillas when he tried to land in their camp. Lundahl had to identify the body, but made no protest to the Zambian authorities.

Related Events

A number of related events followed in the wake of the Maputo CIA scandal. They all indicate that the direct U.S. collusion with South Africa in its genocidal campaigns in southern Africa is taking place on an escalating scale. At the very time the press conferences were being called in Maputo, senior South African intelligence and military officers were visiting Washington, despite long-standing diplomatic policies forbidding such direct contacts. These officials, one of whom had actually been previously expelled from the United States, received visas, travelled to Washington, met with officials of the NSC and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all, according to the State Department, without their knowledge of the South Africans' identities.

It turned out that the officials were invited by the American Security Council, which has long supported close relations with South Africa, and, according to John M. Fisher, ASC president, he had notified the State Department in advance of the invitations, but had not received any reply. The State Department professed surprise and embarrassment, and the South Africans cut short their visit; presumably, not before certain deals were struck.

Most recently, it was learned that U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick also met on March 15 with one of the South Africans, Lt. Gen. P.W. Van Der Westerhuizen, head of military intelligence, despite State Department assertions to the contrary. She also met privately with Dirk Mudge, the white puppet "leader" of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia.

The United States retaliated for the expulsions in Mozambique by abruptly cutting off all food shipments to Mozambique, indicating the level to which humanitarian considerations have sunk in the Reagan administration. Several high officials, including the President, have made public statements in the past few weeks indicating strong support for the South African government, much to the dismay of virtually all other African governments. And South Africa, elated by these expressions of solidarity, has launched more outrageous raids against both Angola and Mozambique. These have included a massive bombing March 17 of the Lubango airfield in southern Angola, more than 190 miles north of the Namibian border, and a bizarre incident March 18 on Mozambique's southern border with South Africa. According to South Africa, some fifty of its soldiers were simply strolling along the unmarked beach and "unsuspectingly and probably innocently" strayed across the line, whereupon they were attacked by Mozambican troops, suffering two deaths before reinforcements arrived to cover the retreat back to South African soil. The South African government had the audacity to refer to the Mozambican action as an "ambush," and said that such deeds "will without a doubt heighten tension on the border." This from the country which less than two months before had staged the murderous Matola raid.

Conclusion

The signals from Washington are more ominous than would have been thought possible a few months ago. The administration has announced its intention to press for the immediate repeal of the Clark Amendment, which purports to prohibit covert CIA operations in Angola—though it has been more honored in the breach during its five years on the books. And, in a major international shock, the administration has announced that it is considering inviting the Prime Minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, for an official visit to the United States. The United States has never before invited a South African Prime Minister to visit, and the proposal has African leaders deeply concerned. The President of Nigeria noted

his fear that Mr. Reagan has no comprehension of the repercussions such a move would have in the entire continent.

It is nevertheless clear that the present U.S. administration is filled with boosters of South Africa intent on engineering a complete turnabout in U.S. foreign policy in the area. Open support for the apartheid regime is now the rule, not the exception. This support only encourages South Africa to resist any accomodation or negotiation with its neighbors, and resistance to change of the apartheid policy at home. If anything, such policies will only hasten the final military conflict in southern Africa. In this war it appears that the United States may be South Africa's only ally in the entire world.

SOUTH AFRICAN RAID

It was early morning on January 30th. Three South African military vehicles, camouflaged to resemble Mozambican army trucks, crossed Mozambique's border just north of Swaziland shortly after midnight. They drove some 50 miles toward Matola, a town near Maputo. The South African commandos, some of whom spoke Portuguese, were dressed in Mozambican-style fatigues, their faces smeared black. As they neared their objective, a Portuguese technician who was a cooperante working for the Mozambican government, was returning home in his Land Rover after checking an electrical installation. He had the misfortune of arriving at an isolated intersection just as the South Africans did. Fearing discovery and abortion of their mission, they sprayed the vehicle with machinegun fire, killing him.



Portuguese Cooperante's Car

The commandos proceeded a mile further into Matola proper and split up to reach their targets. With military precision, they stealthily crept toward the three residences of African National Congress exiles. Then simultaneously, they rained the houses from all sides with mortar fire and grenades and

charged into the houses through doors and windows, machineguns blazing.

CAIB visited the houses two weeks after the attack. The scene was gruesome. The ground outside all three dwellings was littered with spent shells, and the grass was still tramped down by the raiders' boots. All the houses had gaping mortar holes through the walls. Inside, a heavy stench of death hung in the air.

Specious claims by South Africa that the homes were in fact "military bases" were obvious lies. Strewn on the floors were the remains of what had clearly been simple residences and nothing more: cooking pots, broken dishes, old soup bones, a bloodied apron, and a bullet-riddled woman's plaid shirt. Dried blood was splattered everywhere.

Twelve ANC youths—men and women—were executed in the raid, and three more were kidnapped and taken back for certain torture and interrogation. South Africa, though unable to suppress the details of the raid, refused to allow any memorial services in honor of the 12 murdered exiles. Lawyers representing the families of the three kidnapped victims were stonewalled by the Defense Forces. Their fates have not yet been determined.

Two of the South African commandos were killed in the raid, one of them a British mercenary later publicly identified by the South African military. The raiders withdrew so quickly that they could not take his body with them. The other mercenary killed was also apparently born in the U.K., but because he was married to a South African his citizenship was overlooked by spokespeople in Pretoria.

As photos in the world press showed, the dead commando's helmet was decorated on the front with a swastika, and on the rear with the words "Apocalypse Now."

William Joseph Casey

THE "CYCLONE" MOVES IN AT LANGLEY

by Louis Wolf

On December 11, 1980 President-elect Reagan announced his selection of William Joseph Casey to suceed Admiral Stansfield Turner as Director of Central Intelligence. The announcement trumpeted a message to the American people and to peoples and governments around the globe of the much-heightened priority the new administration would give to the intelligence apparatus.

It is essential to review Casey's controversial career in light of the central role he is expected to assume in the Reagan-Bush administration. He is in fact the first DCI to be made a member of the President's Cabinet. Nearly every press report would have readers believe that Casey's connection with intelligence was confined to his World War II service in the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the CIA. As we shall demonstrate, this is not the case.

Background

William Joseph Casey was born 67 years ago in New York City. During his teens, he was nicknamed "Cyclone" by schoolmates because of his volatile temperament. After earning a Bachelor of Science degree at Fordham University and a law degree at St. John's University, he was admitted to the New York Bar in 1938, a year after he joined the Research Institute of America. In 1942, General William "Wild Bill" Donovan recruited him into the OSS under cover of the U.S. Naval Reserve when it became apparent that Casey's poor eyesight would disqualify him from active sea duty. At 29, he became chief of the OSS secret intelligence branch in the Western Europe sector, and from his London office, coordinated several hundred men involved with the war's most sensitive intelligence and sabotage missions in Germany and France.

After the war, he worked closely with General Donovan and some of his OSS colleagues in the formation of the CIA. He is known to have argued strongly for the institutionalization of covert action as the moving force of U.S. postwar intelligence. He proudly claims a role in helping to establish how the CIA would be organized and function. Casey also applied his intelligence experience to the Marshall Plan, the postwar economic recovery program for Western Europe which was central to the U.S. strategy of limiting the influence of the socialist and communist unions and political leaders. Casey was a key advisor to the Plan during the early 1950s.

Still with the Research Institute of America, Casey also lectured at the New York Institute on Federal Taxation, entering the field in which he was to become famous and rich. He began practicing law in 1950, and in 1953, his Wall Street orientation took shape as he joined the Institute for

Business Planning, a subsidiary of the Prentice-Hall publishing company. He stayed there for seventeen years and carved out a niche for himself as an author and editor of various manuals for business people and lawyers. Among the 30-plus publications that would earn him millions were such evocative titles as: "How to Build and Preserve Executive Wealth" and "How to Raise Money to Make Money." During his unsuccessful 1966 campaign for a congressional seat, he bragged: "I've made all the money in business that my family could ever spend."

It was one of the Casey tax manuals that stirred up a hornet's nest. In 1964, a lawyer-author who had submitted a book manuscript to Prentice-Hall brought a plagiarism suit against Casey upon realizing that 21/2 pages of text from the work, which the firm had already rejected, found their way into the text of one of Casey's manuals. His deposition was taken; the transcript shows that he swore at the author's lawyer, now dead, and threatened in a string of expletives to "kick your ass out of here." The judge in the case has since stated that plagiarism had indeed been committed. Even Casey has admitted there was plagiarism, but alleged that his subordinates were to blame for it though he was editor of the manual. While Casey represented that the judge had ordered the record sealed on his own initiative, the judge told Congress it was Casey's lawyers who had done so "for the purpose of expunging the verdict and the record of the trial and possible attendant publicity."



William Casey

The Nixon Years

One of the incongruities in Casey's career is his nomination by President Nixon in 1971 to be chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a post for which he seemingly had few qualifications. Commentators noted at the time that Casey, a major financial contributor to the Republican Party for some years, had been head of a foreign policy research group which wrote position papers for then-Vice-President Nixon during his 1960 presidential campaign. He was also one of Nixon's many speechwriters.

During confirmation hearings for the SEC job before the Senate Banking Committee, activities in Casey's business past came back to haunt him. Not only was there the instance of plagiarism. In 1961, when he was chairman of a small computer company called Advancement Devices, Inc., a letter was sent to potential investors which grossly misrepresented the company's future plans and capabilities, alleging it was on the verge of becoming "a multimillion dollar business" and "one of America's top industries." The company was actually on the verge of collapse. The letter was apparently written by one of Casey's employees, who had been barred by the SEC from employment in the financial securities field. Casey sought to blame him, alleging he hadn't read the letter before it was mailed.

In yet another business venture, he was arranging a merger of two companies. It was asserted that he and other company officers had exaggerated the value of one of the two companies. Rather than execute the merger in California, where the commissioner of corporations stipulated a public hearing on the terms of the deal, Casey abruptly moved the merger to Louisiana. Casey said that he and the other "grown men" involved in the deal did not "need the protective services of the California Corporation Commission."

Despite these improprieties and his flagrantly contemptuous stance toward the laws he would be expected to enforce in the job, he was confirmed as SEC chairman. He boldly stated that his record of legal battles was normal for somebody in "an active business career." One of the Senators who voted against the appointment, William Proxmire (Democrat, Wisconsin), observed that Casey "has cut corners when he considered it to be necessary to business profit. He has wheeled and dealed his way into a personal fortune, sometimes at the expense of his clients."

In 1972, just before the election, there were reports that International Telephone and Telegraph Company offered a \$400,000 campaign contribution to the Nixon re-election committee in exchange for a government settlement in a potentially explosive antitrust case involving illegal sales of ITT stock using inside corporate information. A congressional investigating committee was about to subpoena from the SEC 34 boxes of internal ITT documents which included precise evidence about conversations between top ITT personnel and Attorney General John Mitchell, John Connally, Charles Colson and others.

SEC chairman Casey beat the committee to the punch by suddenly transferring the boxes from the SEC building to the Justice Department, placing the data out of the committee's reach. At first he stated he had done so at the request of Justice, but some months later admitted it was his decision to move the records. He admitted that Mitchell's subordinate had reluctantly agreed to accept the worrisome material, but only after Casey and John Dean, the legendary White House counsel, prevailed on him to do so. During the controversy, it was also suggested he had lied about it to other SEC members.

On February 12, 1972, Casey met with Harry Sears, one of the lawyers for fugitive financier Robert Vesco. The meeting took place during an SEC fraud investigation of Vesco, on the very day when a secret \$200,000 contribution from Vesco was made to CREEP, the Campaign to Re-Elect the President. Incredibly, Casey testified later that he knew nothing of the Vesco money until he read about it in the newspapers. This was a hollow defense since his successor at SEC insisted Casey had explicitly urged that data about the Vesco offering be deleted from the SEC suit against Vesco.

Other posts Casey held during the Nixon era were Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank. These appointments were facilitated by his long association with Nixon, and by one of his New York law partners, Leonard Hall, former chairman of the Republican National Committee. The New York Times even nominated Casey to Nixon's 1973 "all star team," later to become a questionable honor.

Casey's Intelligence Connections

Parallel with his multifaceted business and legal professions, Casey kept his hand in the intelligence and foreign affairs field. He was a founding director of the National Strategy Information Center, a right-wing New York think tank which is close to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, all of which have CIA ties. The Agency used NSIC as its pipeline to pay for books commissioned by Forum World Features, a CIA-owned proprietary "news service" based in London until its CIA links were exposed in 1976 (see review of "The Spike" in CAIB Number 10). Through NSIC, he helped arrange the creation of chairs and professorships on intelligence and national security at some two-hundred American college campuses. He is also on the advisory board of the National Intelligence Study Center, a Washington "non-profit, taxexempt educational institution" created "to improve public support" for the U.S. intelligence apparatus by "a few academic, military, and former government specialists in the field of intelligence, national security, defense, and foreign policy."

Between 1974-76, he was a member of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy (known as the Murphy Commission after its late chairman Robert D. Murphy, for years a member of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities created by President Eisenhower). Casey's special interest there was reorganization of the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus and "developing a more effective relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence" data.

From 1966-71, while serving with the NSIC, he was president and executive committee chairman of the International Rescue Committee, which over the years has worked closely with the CIA in certain programs involving refugees. The head of the IRC since 1951 and an old friend, Leo Cherne, has for years been involved in intelligenceconnected activity. In 1976, he was identified by the New York Times as the recipient at the IRC of at least \$15,000 from the CIA in the 1960s. Described in some accounts as "a New York economist," Cherne is a founder, board of trustees member and honorary chairman of Freedom House, the rightist human rights monitoring group that portrays itself as an alternative to the highly respected Amnesty International. Freedom House released its 1981 Map of Freedom which describes such dictatorships and military juntas as those in Chile, Taiwan, El Salvador, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Guatemala as "partly free." Given his longtime links to people in the intelligence community, it was no surprise to observers that Cherne was named by President Ford to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and its successor body, the Intelligence Oversight Board. Likewise it was logical that he rushed to Casey's side with a statement distributed at the Senate confirmation hearing filled with praise for the CIA Director-designate.

President Ford named Casey as a member of the PFIAB in February 1976. Cherne had been its chairman since 1973. Casey's abiding ties to intelligence were further tightened when he joined the board of directors of AFIO, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (see CAIB Number 11). One knowledgeable source revealed to CAIB that he was one of the most forceful and determined advocates of the view that AFIO should attempt to wield a strong influence in Washington on intelligence issues and legislation—i.e. lobby for the intelligence apparatus.

Yet another organization in which Casey has been active, as a co-director since 1976, is the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based organization that "seeks to promote closer mutually advantageous ties between Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand." Among the 83 other directors are David Abshire (head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Henry Kissinger (a Council director since 1967), Brent Scowcroft (a key national security person in the Nixon White House), Jay Lovestone (a well-known operative in the CIA's postwar international labor operations through the AFL-CIO's international affairs division and a Council director since it began in 1962), and Anne Armstrong (former ambassador to the United Kingdom and one of President Reagan's most favored woman political figures).

The ultra-conservative thrust of Casey's politics is also no mystery. He helped to incorporate William F. Buckley, Jr.'s magazine, National Review, and was instrumental in keeping in business the even more rightist newspaper, Human Events. In mid-1969, while a Fordham University trustee, he emerged as the head of a "grass roots" organization sponsoring a full-page advertisement in the New York Times in support of the anti-ballistic missile system. Many

signatures were beneath a banner headline asserting, incredibly, that "84 percent of Americans support the ABM," but the legitimacy of the ad was called into question when it was learned a large portion of the signers were executives, bankers, or lawyers of aerospace companies with Pentagon contracts for construction of the ABM, and that Casey's "grass roots" group was located in Room 495 of the White House annex. It was ironic that shortly after, he was named as an advisor to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At almost the same time, there were yet more full-page declarations by the self-described "Silent Majority" in favor of Nixon's Vietnam war policy. Other "silent" signatories of these expensive ads include well-known lobbyists of rightwing causes Leo Cherne and Clare Boothe Luce.

Some years ago, Casey was in the market for a home in Washington. After outbidding the Japanese Embassy on the house he ultimately purchased, he was asked what to say to the Japanese. "Tell them to remember Pearl Harbor," was his reply.

Casey's Views

What then are Casey's ideas on the CIA and the rest of the massive intelligence apparatus of which he now becomes the chief executive? His prepared statement during the confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 13 was less than totally candid, but it and some of the barely audible answers he offered up in reply to questions from Senators may be somewhat indicative. He declared, perhaps a bit rhetorically, that he seeks a comprehensive intelligence system of unqualified preeminence... Too many have worked to reduce the feeling of self-worth of intelligence officers."

He signalled the effort he will make to exploit the small sector of the American academic community willing to work for the CIA, saying: "We must tap the insights of the nation's scholars . . . [to see intelligence] as a profession, part-time as well as full-time."

After casually referring to the CIA's "alleged misdeeds of the past," he asserted that as CIA Director he would sanction covert operations against the governments of other countries "when it is in the highest interests of the United States." Since everything the CIA does is traditionally claimed to be in those "highest interests," this may be an ominous statement, particularly when it is remembered that the Heritage Foundation and other boosters of the CIA have openly and loudly been calling for the "unleashing" of the CIA, most notably in the field of covert action. Casey announced he is in favor of "unleashing the ability of the organization to initiate and carry out its objectives."

A prime area in which he is expected to build on the initiatives of his predecessor, Admiral Turner, is the expanded use of U.S. corporations, both to provide cover for CIA personnel abroad, and in CIA-sponsored and controlled proprietary activities in various countries. His business experience, most recently as the head of an advisory committee on possible reorganization of the American Stock Exchange, has provided him with priceless access to

a wide circle of like-minded business executives inclined to help the Agency, especially if it will protect their own overseas corporate interests.

The new DCI ventured a pledge that he would protect the legal rights and civil liberties of American citizens. Even were he sincere, he would likely find it a tough pledge to honor, as so much of what the Agency does by definition violates those very rights and liberties. More to the point, this "commitment" says nothing of the same rights and liberties of other peoples and countries around the globe.

Casey voiced strong agreement with the CIA-supported efforts to criminalize the naming of names and to exempt the CIA and FBI from the Freedom of Information Act. This coincides with a concerted move to make the activities of the intelligence apparatus, at home and abroad, more secret than ever. *Time* magazine quotes a CIA official: "You just don't pass things on officially anymore. You do it orally, over a cup of coffee." While saying he will be cooperative with Congress, the new DCI served notice on the Committee: "There is a point at which rigid accountability, detailed accountability can impair performance."

Further the expressed views of Casey need to be understood in the context of the outlook of Congress, especially of the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona). He was somewhat more explicit than Casey. In a rather bold revision of CIA history, given the Church Committee's 1975 report on the Agency's operations in Chile, Goldwater referred on January 26 to "incidents such as reportedly occurred in Chile which, frankly, never occurred but the American people were led to believe they had occurred." In another context, during the Casey confirmation hearing, he declared that "U.S. space policy has profound implications for intelligence capabilities. Any new development for space launch and exploration should consider the impact it may have on military and intelligence missions." NASA may have to move over.

Bobby Ray Inman

Among the most important persons in the new administration is the new Deputy DCI, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman. (He was Vice-Admiral until this appointment, when he was promoted to four-star rank.) Since Casey's nomination was announced, intelligence insiders were buzzing not only about Casey, but also about who his deputy would be. Throughout the CIA's history, either the Director or the Deputy Director was always a military man; not only for the sake of tradition either. The military's input to and influence upon the CIA and the rest of the intelligence "community" has been very substantial and, in the Reagan-Bush-Haig scheme of things, the Pentagon's star is definitely rising. There were a number of indications that the CIA's own candidate for the DDCI slot was finally chosen. It is known that those who placed Inman's name before Reagan wanted to be sure Casey's flanks were covered on a day-to-day basis by an intelligence professional with a total up-to-date grasp of the technological and human spheres of intelligence gathering and operations.

For Inman, who was previously director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and then the National Security Agency (see CAIB Number 11), this new job might at first appear a demotion, explaining why he was quoted saying that he didn't want the assignment. It was since impressed on him that he really is moving up, and will be much more than just a deputy to Casey, both now and in the future. He is also well-liked by Goldwater and other members of the intelligence committees, another valuable attribute. Goldwater calls him "the outstanding intelligence expert in the world."

Conclusion

It is no secret in Washington that Casey for a long time hoped to become either Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, or Director of Central Intelligence. His position in the Reagan-Bush administration is especially significant in view of his very close personal relationship with and access to the new President. Not only was he Reagan's campaign manager over the critical last six months of the protracted run for the White House; once the election was won, Casey was part of the small inner circle which chose Cabinet appointees, both before and after Reagan nominated him for the DCI post. In addition, he can count on former DCI Bush to be a loyal ally when pivotal intelligence-related or foreign policy decisions are made in the Cabinet.

In his spare time, Casey plays golf and reads unendingly; it is said that his personal library contains some 10,000 books. He is known as a hard worker who expects those around him to keep going beyond the normal eight hours. One former associate in his law firm described it as "a legal sweatshop."

His devotion to work, perhaps as much as his shady ethics, has made him a millionaire. His reported income for 1980 was \$317,000 including a \$160,000 salary. He claims holdings in no less than 25 different corporations, and is a limited partner in a number of varied enterprises, including waste recycling, financial analysis, import-export, small submarines and racquet-ball courts. His current wealth is reputed to be in the range of \$6 million.

Although there have been assorted intelligence-connected activities in his career since World War II, he testified that he has spent his "working life as a practicing lawyer, and as an author, editor and entrepreneur." Yet, it is clear that as far as he is concerned, he can now afford to take a slight pay cut in what is likely to be his last job.

Some active CIA personnel expressed trepidation that he views the CIA too much with General Donovan's OSS "night parachute drop" approach to problems. Former OSS veteran and author Joseph Persico remembers "Casey has always been an admirer of Donovan. It would be the realization of a dream for him to become the General Donovan of his day."

William Joseph "Cyclone" Casey has arrived.

New Threat to Civil Liberties

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

By Margaret Ratner*

One of the first actions of the new Republican-dominated Senate was to set up a Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism (SST). Three ultra-conservative Senators form its majority, and at least one of them has the potential for becoming a new McCarthy—this time under an administration which fully supports congressional witchhunts. Bills to create a similar committee in the House of Representatives have been introduced and have a good change of passing. Such a committee, if formed, may well include Larry McDonald (Dem.-Ga.) and John Ashbrook (Rep.-Ohio), two of the most conservative people in Congress.

The SST has the power to subpoena people requiring them to appear and give testimony. As was demonstrated by similar committees in the past—most notably the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) and the Senate Internal Security Committee (SISC)—the result can be the destruction of reputations, by labelling people anti-American, subversive, terrorist, or unwitting dupes of a foreign power; the loss of jobs; limited abilities to secure a livelihood; deportation for non-citizens; as well as jail for perjury or contempt of Congress.

Any assessment of the potential of SST has to take into consideration its members and staff, the forces behind it, and administation policy on related issues. What follows is a review of these data, which points inescapably to the conclusion that SST has the capability and the backing to move this country backward to the dark ages of McCarthyism.

The Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism

SST's chairman is Jeremiah Denton (Rep.-Ala.), a highly-decorated Vietnam veteran who spent seven years as a prisoner of war. Denton was elected last November with the support of the Moral Majority, a New Right religious fundamentalist coalition. His public utterances and activities, including founding the Coalition for Decency, tend to focus on the moral decay threatening society from pornography, pre-marital sex, and the destruction of the nuclear

family. At the Subcommittee's first hearing, which concerned the budget for the FBI, Denton made the following statement:

"A principal reason for the creation of this Subcommittee is the need to address the concerns over an alarming rise in world wide terrorism. There is evidence that certain foreign powers support or incite terrorist activities directed against the national interest of the United States. These activities not only endanger lives, but in many instances cost the lives of U.S. persons. Therefore the Subcommittee will hold hearings bearing on matters relating to terrorist activities and to national security matters within the scope of the jurisdictional interest of the Judiciary Committee. Within that context, we will review and investigate those activities of foreign governments and entities which tend to weaken our national security.

"The Subcommittee also plans to investigate certain organizations which, within the United States, engage in, or have engaged in acts of terrorism, including bombings, acts of sabotage, aircraft hijacking, armed assaults and homicides."

The Washington Post reported that the SST would "keep watch over Communist activities in the United States and would have added jurisdiction over terrorism."

John East (Rep.-N.C.), another freshman New Right Senator on the Subcommittee, has taken strong positions on issues he believes affect national security. Elected with the support of Sen. Jesse Helms (Rep.-N.C.), East fought his campaign on the danger of Carter's "liberal" international policies, such as the Panama Canal "give-away." Both Helms and East see "creeping communism" as the greatest threat to the United States. Another indication of East's program is his choice of Samuel Francis as a Congressional aide.

Samuel T. Francis is a policy analyst with the Heritage Foundation who specializes in African affairs and international terrorism. He is reputed to be an expert on underground political groups and activities. Heritage Foundation is a right-wing think tank whose ties to the Reagan administration are discussed below. Francis was the editor of the 97-page intelligence section of the Heritage Report that was given to the new administration as a blueprint for the 1980s.

Orrin Hatch (Rep.-Utah) is the third ultra-conservative on the SST. He has close ties with the Moral Majority also. The original rumors about the Subcommittee, even before it was formed, came from his office, hinting that it would investigate the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), a progressive organization which focuses on the political economy of the Americas, publishing its research in the respected NACLA Report on the Americas; on Mother Jones, a magazine published in San Francisco which concentrates on investigative journalism and is known for its progressive ecology positions; and on the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a progressive strategy center in Washington which focuses on international issues.

^{*}Margaret Ratner is a staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City. This article will appear shortly in a CCR publication, "Fight the Right." For further information, write to: CCR, 853 Broadway, New York, NY 10003.

Democrats on the SST are Joseph Biden (Del.) and Patrick Leahy (Vt.) who, as minority members, may issue a limited number of subpoenas and choose some of the staff.

Joel Lisker, an ex-FBI agent whose Bureau work consisted mainly of investigating groups and individuals to determine whether they would be compelled to register as representatives of foreign powers, was named Chief Counsel, perhaps the most important staff position of all.

The Heritage Foundation

The forces behind the new Subcommittee include the Heritage Foundation. It is a major element in the new administration and reportedly has sufficient power to veto administration appointments of which it disapproves. Heritage's Intelligence Report to the Reagan administration details the need for expanding and strengthening intelligence agencies and internal security. It specifically calls for the restoration of legislative committees to investigate threats to internal security as "a necessary part of an adequate internal security program." Heritage's connection with the SST and with the new administration demonstrate the importance of its policy role. Edwin Meese, III, the President's chief counsel, participated in the Heritage deliberations. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., president of Heritage, was an assistant to Rep. Phil Crane (Rep.-Ill.), and was head of Reagan's foreign aid transition team. (Crane is actively seeking the resurrection of a House Committee to investigate terrorism.)

Assistance in drafting the Heritage Report was also provided by one of the committees of the National Strategy Information Center, which was founded in 1962 by Reagan's CIA Director, William Casey. NSIC also had representatives on Reagan's intelligence transition team.

Two other groups were also influential in spurring the creation of the SST: The American Security Council (ASC) and the National Committee to Restore Internal Security (NCRIS). The ASC is an older conservative coalition that historically functioned as a supporter of such intelligence committees. J. William Middendorf, II, former Secretary of the Navy and the head of Reagan's CIA transition task force, is a member of the national strategy committee of ASC, was finance chairman of the Reagan Inaugural Committee, and a member of the advisory board of the National Intelligence Study Center, run by former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline. He has recently been appointed Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

NCRIS is made up of ex-staffers of the old investigative committees as well as Jay Parker, an influential New Righter who is expected to be appointed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee. Parker, a Black, heads the Lincoln Institute in Washington, an avowed conservative counterpart to the NAACP, which Parker considers a leftist organization. NCRIS, in calling for the formation of such committees, warned of increasing "terrorism, subversion and espionage and enemy-directed misinformation."



Ray Cline

Ideological Basis

In the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig has been the voice of the threat of international terrorism. According to Haig, "international terrorism will take the place of human rights" as the priority concern of foreign policy. Haig's definition of terrorism appears to cover struggles for national liberation and civil wars to oust military dictatorships. United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick echoes this position as does Ernest Lefever, an ultra-conservative nominated by Reagan for Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The same can be said for Kirkpatrick's deputy, Charles Lichtenstein, a New Right public relations expert, who is a vocal backer of restoring a "full-service intelligence capability." Lichtenstein, who contributed the Afterword to "The CIA and the American Ethic," by Lefever and Roy Godson, a rightwing labor idealogue, was senior vice-president of the Public Broadcasting Service.

Through these appointments the Reagan administration has made clear that its anti-communism will masquerade as a concern over the threat of international terrorism, rather than a concern for human rights violations, as with its predecessor. It also means there will be unambiguous support for brutal military dictatorships so long as those governments support U.S. interests. Domestically this shift from a focus on human rights to one on terrorism is demonstrated by the formation of the SST which, under guidance from Heritage, will stand for the proposition that, when civil liberties come into conflict with "national security," even broadly and vaguely defined, the latter must be given priority.

The Subcommittee's Targets

Who are the targets of this Subcommittee? As noted, Sen. Hatch's office named NACLA, Mother Jones, and IPS. Heritage added "the several Communist parties," radical and New Left groups, Tom Hayden's Campaign for Economic Democracy, and "clergymen, students, businessmen, entertainers, labor officials, journalists and government workers [who] may engage in subversive activities without being fully aware of the extent, purposes, or control of their activities." There have been rumors that the SST will first focus on the export of technology by corporations to less-than-friendly foreign governments, and that it will hold such hearings in order to gain some legitimacy.

Significantly, the SST has been assigned jurisdiction over the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, the so-called "Names of Agents Act." This bill, aimed at the CovertAction Information Bulletin, seeks, despite its nickname, to criminalize the publication not only of names of undercover intelligence operatives but also of "any information that identifies" such an operative. Moreover, it applies not only to the CIA but also to the the FBI and other agencies with intelligence functions. And, most significantly, it is not limited to information obtained from classified sources. It is likely that the Subcommittee will use its hearings on this bill to attack the entire movement against government spying, against COINTELPRO-type operations, and the like.

It can also be presumed that the Chief Counsel, Mr. Lisker, given his background, will be interested in calling persons and groups involved in any kind of international solidarity work, or with any contacts with people or groups in other countries.

The Propaganda Purpose

The history of Congressional investigative committees demonstrates that the main purpose for holding hearings is to propagandize, rarely to legislate. The Heritage Report candidly states that the function of such a committee should be to educate citizens and legislators alike to the threat of terrorism and the need for increased concern and activity to protect our national security.

There is a need on the part of the government to rally support for the concept of a terrorist threat. The SST may be used as a propaganda machine whose function is to generate fear. The belief in a terrorist threat is needed to allow the U.S. to support regimes such as the one in El Salvador; to grant to the FBI and the CIA the extra support required if they are to carry out more illegal and repressive operations at home and around the world; to support increased defense expenditures; to support the cutbacks in social programs; to control the dissent that such cutbacks will fuel; and to curtail civil liberties in general.

The Witnesses

The first witnesses to be called, and perhaps the first

large investigations, will be orchestrated to garner public support for the Subcommittee's work. The first witnesses will be "friendly." They will set out the need for investigation into certain areas because of various asserted threats to our national security.

If the SST feels that it has gained support, it may then move to subpoena persons who are less interested in cooperating. The witness will receive a subpoena commanding him or her to appear before the Subcommittee; the subpoena can be for testimony or for documents or for both. A witness has the right to be represented by a lawyer, and the latter may or may not be allowed to address the Subcommittee. The SST may also attempt to limit the witness's consultation with the attorney. The witness can file a statement with the SST before appearing, outlining any objections or otherwise commenting on the subpoena or the hearings.

Although witnesses can assert their privilege under the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer questions, the right is of little value. Congress can grant a witness immunity from prosecution, which eliminates one's ability to take the Fifth Amendment.

Contempt

In addition to the damage to one's reputation which may stem from simply being called before such a body, an uncooperative witness may face imprisonment. Refusal to appear or to cooperate fully after appearing can result in either civil or criminal contempt action. To pursue a contempt action, the Subcommittee will need to obtain the approval of the full Senate.

In a criminal contempt proceeding the witness is indicted by a grand jury and receives a full criminal trial. Conviction can result in a sentence ranging from one month to one year in jail and a fine of from \$100 to \$1000. If the Subcommittee proceeds by civil contempt, the trial is a summary one without a jury. In such a civil proceeding, the witness can decide to testify at any time, even after being cited for contempt, or after incarceration, and if the witness cooperates the proceeding will end. If a witness is jailed for civil contempt, the Subcommittee can seek to keep the uncooperative witness in jail even beyond the end of a Congressional session.

There are many legal and technical procedures involved in contesting such a subpoena and the ensuing proceedings, and persons subpoenaed should consult with an attorney experienced in this field at the earliest opportunity.

Conclusion

The SST is only one of the many frontal attacks which progressive forces in the United States are facing from the new administration. Other bills and executive orders and legislation are all part of a coordinated effort to unleash repression at home and abroad. But the SST will be one of the most visible operations, and the one with the most effective propaganda potential. Concerted resistance to that propaganda can be effective; the propaganda can be turned around.

Spies and the Reagan Victory

"THE OCTOBER 22 MOVEMENT"

by Fred Landis

The election of Ronald Reagan on November 4, 1980, was not merely a victory for the Moral Majority and other, more traditionally conservative supporters of the Republican ticket. It was in many respects the long-planned triumph of a cabal of renegade intelligence officers dissatisfied with trends in U.S. foreign policy which manifested themselves during the Carter Administration in a perceived overemphasis on human rights. The target of this group was not just the White House, but most importantly the Congressional committees that supervise foreign policy, and the new Administration's transition team for foreign policy.

The group is comprised of former CIA officers and their agents, many of whom were exposed and interrogated during the Congressional investigatons of the mid-1970s which centered on CIA wrongdoing, some of whom quit and some of whom were fired during the Ford and Carter Administrations. What is now clear is that these individuals, and the organizations they run, form the backbone of much of the Reagan foreign policy, intelligence, and defense teams.

Some of the intelligence officers who were fired, or forced to retire, accepted their fate, but many did not. Those who decided to fight began to operate out of three interrelated Washington-based organizations: the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Heritage Foundation. One of their driving purposes was to avenge themselves on Senators Church, Bayh, and McGovern, and other politicians and Senate staffers who had exposed them, and to root out of the CIA and the Pentagon those officials who had blown the whistle on them.

It took some time to orchestrate the master plan. The plumbing had to be put in place (the think tanks geared up), Carter foreign policy had to be sabotaged, and a domestic backlash had to be mobilized. It was a classic political action and psychological warfare operation—albeit conducted on U.S. soil. The CIA officers involved were all "retired," so they were not subject even to normal bureaucratic controls. There were no restrictions on what this brotherhood of disgruntled spies could do by way of dirty tricks, and little financial limit on what could be spent on their attack on liberal Congressmen and their supporters. This was not a "support your friends" operation but a "sabotage your enemies" campaign.

Disinformation

One tip-off that an intelligence operation was taking place under cover of the electoral campaign was the sudden upsurge in the popular use of the term "disinformation." Disinformation is an intelligence word which describes the covert attempt to manipulate the informational environment of a selected target group by such actions as planted stories, selective leaks, rumors, forged documents—all orchestrated toward a particular theme—in this case the election campaign.

Among the many forgeries used in this campaign were the alleged letter from Senator Kennedy to the Ayatollah Khomeini and the phony photograph of an alleged Soviet communications installation in Cuba (which appeared in the September 17, 1979 *Time* magazine). Some observers believe that the memorandum on Black Africa, NSC-46, which surfaced in September 1980, was also a forgery attributable to this group, although many people who have studied the memorandum believe that it is genuine.

Selective leaks and outright fabrications were used to depict national security advisor David Aaron as a Soviet agent, and Billy Carter as an agent of international terrorism, both with the short-term political aim of putting the Carter Administration on the spot.

Hundreds of articles were planted to create an artificial

crisis atmosphere over the four Soviet "threats": a Soviet master plan for World War III, Soviet backing of international terrorists, Soviet "moles" in the CIA, and Soviet penetration of the U.S. media. These stories, particularly the way in which they were used during the election campaign, were disinformation.

The Spike

While many articles were used to promote these themes, they can all be found in a single source, *The Spike*, by Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave. *The Spike* is the manifesto of the intelligence renegades. Its principal argument is that there is a mysterious entity called disinformation, and that the Soviets invented it. Because this group planned to use the technique of disinformation within the U.S. and because they realized that it would be used on such a scale as to raise questions among thoughtful observers, they raised the issue themselves in advance. *The Spike* introduced the U.S. public to the phenomenon and firmly associated it with the Soviets so that when the strange stories began to appear, many people would, at the worst, blame some foreign intelligence service.

This interpretation was first advanced in this author's article in the August-September 1980 CAIB; it was later elaborated by Daniel Schorr in the October 12, 1980 Washington Post; and further discussed by Andrew Kopkind in the November 1, 1980 Nation. Thus, before the elections, three articles had appeared predicting a right-wing grab for power by former intelligence officers through the spread of disinformation, and pointing out that The Spike was the principal psychological warfare weapon in their arsenal.

The Heritage Foundation and CSIS

The aftermath of the elections, especially the key role which the Heritage Foundation and CSIS assumed in the Reagan transition team, have confirmed the predictions of these three articles. The facts make it imperative that people whose sensibilities are offended by studies of right-wing cabals and intelligence techniques must learn to overcome this shortsightedness.

The CAIB article points out that the editor of Heritage publications had been the chief CIA disinformation agent in Chile in 1970-1973, while the editor of CSIS publications was the chief disinformation agent in Italy in 1976. Whatever the other purposes of those institutions, once Robert Moss and Michael Ledeen appeared on the scene and began planting stories about "Euroterrorism," "Eurocommunism," "Euroneutralism," KGB moles, and World War III, those institutes became de facto centers for the intrigues of the group under scrutiny here.

The most virulent element within this brotherhood can be called the October 22 Movement. Members have included: David Atlee Phillips, Richard Helms, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, the late Thomas Karamessines, and Ray Cline. The history of secrecy and deception in U.S. policy over the last decade is largely the history of these individuals.

October 22

Examining their secret wars, whether in Chile, Cuba, Vietnam, Watergate, Iran, or the 1980 election campaign, is greatly simplified by using the date October 22 as a starting point. In the office of the CIA Director, it is always October 22. Behind his desk is a gold calendar commemorating this date, placed there by President Kennedy as an award for the CIA's role during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis—the date Kennedy and the CIA felt they had regained the honor they had lost at the Bay of Pigs.

There are many other examples of the significance of October 22 in the intelligence world (see sidebar), but one of the most important is October 22, 1970, in Santiago, Chile. That is the date the Chairman of the Chilean Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Rene Schneider, was assassinated. This was the first political assassination in Chilean history. In the possession of the conspirators were three unmarked machine guns supplied earlier by the CIA. Fabricated news stories appeared worldwide blaming a nonexistent "leftist-extremist" group, the "Peasant-Workers Brigade." The operation was known within the CIA as "Track II."

Track II

Of all the covert operations uncovered during the Senate investigations this was the most secret and the most sensitive. It touched all the nerve spots: CIA and assassinations, CIA use of disinformation, CIA use of the media. Only seven individuals had prior knowledge of Track II—Phillips, Helms, Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, Karamessines, and Cline.

Pushing for exposure of Track II were Senators Frank Church, Walter Mondale, and Gary Hart. Among the Intelligence Committee staffers were William Miller, David Aaron, and Anthony Lake. Friendly witnesses during the Chile investigation included former CIA Director William Colby. Readers of *The Spike* will note that these individuals comprise the moles uncovered in that story; they were also the targets of political hit lists and character assassination during the recent election campaign.

The initial reaction to *The Spike* on the part of liberal reporters was to dismiss it as a bad joke, largely because the selection of individuals such as Colby and Mondale as KGB moles seemed so absurd. Yet there was a logic to it; the alleged moles were the committee chairman, staff director, staff members, and friendly witnesses before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Disinformaton is a tactical weapon in a war. It has nothing to do with either surface plausibility or the genuinely held beliefs of the authors.

Robert Moss is the hit man for the October 22 Movement, now as he was earlier in Chile. The three analyses of *The Spike* mentioned above all note that Moss was the author of a CIA-financed book about Chile. That in itself is not saying a great deal; the CIA has admitted to having financed over 1,200 books. They even volunteered five categories of books, in which "Chile Under Allende"

topped the list. But what Moss did was a bit more; he put between two covers all the strategic disinformation used by the CIA as cover for the piecemeal seizure of power in Chile, particularly the non-existent "Commander Pepe" and his phantom guerrilla camp, the strategic deception used as cover for a military seizure of power in the southern province of Cautin.

CBS Reports recently broadcast a special on "The Return of the CIA" which dealt with Track II. David Phillips, smooth, urbane, articulate, experienced using the covers of actor, lecturer, and journalist, was questioned about Track II:

CBS: Besides the CIA officers directly involved and the President, who else knew about this operation?

Phillips: At the Nati . . . he . . . he was the Nati . . . National Security Advisor. He knew. General Haig, the President's aide knew.

The program went on:

CBS: What they weren't supposed to tell anyone went by the code name "Track II," described by Intelligence Committee staff member Gregory Treverton.

Treverton: Between October 5 and October 20, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military officials in Chile. Coup plotters within the Chilean military were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the United States government.

Although Track II failed in its 1970 operation, due to the exposure of the plot, the CIA was able in the long run to regroup its human assets, who prevailed in 1973. Thomas Karamessines, who died in September 1978, was the only member of the October 22 Movment to testify truthfully before the Senate Committee. He said that Track II never ended, and what triumphed on September 11, 1973, had its seeds in October 22, 1970.

The Track II criminals are now the government of Chile; but what of their American mentors?

David Phillips "retired" from the CIA in 1975 to found the first real spy lobby, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO). It is made up of more than 2000 former spies from some nine intelligence agencies. [See CAIB Number 11, page 26.] Phillips lobbies full-time for the CIA, squeezing in an insipid book or two, is a frequent Congressional witness, and is very active on the lucrative lecture circuit.

Ray Cline is Director of Research at the Georgetown CSIS. A large number of CIA, NSA and State Department cold warriors are in residence there, and a great many of their associates are moving into the Reagan administration, having controlled the intelligence and national security transition teams. CSIS harbors many of the top officials of the national security apparatus at the time of the Chile campaign, including Henry Kissinger.

Richard Nixon has most recently been credited as the

architect of the selection of Alexander Haig as Secretary of State. He also authored a book, *The Real War*, which was almost as influential as *The Spike* during the campaign. *The Real War* was actually ghosted by Haig's predecessor as Nixon flunky, former CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters. Walters openly attributed the book's themes to Robert Moss, his mentor Brian Crozier, Ray Cline, and the publications of CSIS and the Heritage Foundation.

Richard Helms, who contributed the term destabilization to the vocabulary, is the hero of the Track II conspirators. He took the rap and never squealed. Indeed, he lied under oath to the Senate Committeee. After being convicted of perjury and getting a slap on the wrist for it, he stood proudly in front of television cameras and journalists as his attorney declared that Helms would wear the conviction as a "badge of honor." Later, he went to a party organized by Kissinger in his honor, at the home of columnist Tom Braden (former head of psychological warfare for the CIA in Europe). Present were all the Track II conspirators, who toasted his loyalty under fire.

Other October 22 Actions

A look at some of the other October 22 actions demonstrates the many links of the group of men under discussion.

October 22, 1972—The Cuban Missile Crisis. A great deal of new information has recently come to light about David Phillips' activities during the Cuban missile crisis as a result of the House Assassinations Committee investigations. Committee staffer Gaeton Fonzi, in a book-length article in the November Washingtonian magazine, described by the editors as "the detective story of the century," tells of the trail that led to Phillips. From the beginnings of his work for the Committee, Fonzi sensed intelligence connections throughout. "The issue I wanted to pursue involved the patterns of verified misinformation—almost all linking Oswald to Castro-that were born in Miami immediately after the assassination." Fonzi describes Phillips' career in the CIA in some detail. "His known successes . . . were mainly in propaganda, psychological warfare, and counterintelligence." By 1961, he was "propaganda chief of the Bay of Pigs operations," having been, until 1960, "a deep-cover operative in Havana posing as a public-relations consultant."

The key figure in the Kennedy assassination investigations was a CIA undercover operative known as Maurice Bishop.* Bishop had been in Cuba during the early days after the Revolution, and, among other things, had trained and run Antonio Veciana, one of the key figures in the Cuban exile movement. Bishop was pivotal because Veciana saw Bishop in Dallas, Texas, in September 1963, with Lee Harvey Oswald. For reasons made clear in his article, Fonzi is convinced that Maurice Bishop was, in

^{*} It is unfortunate that the pseudonym taken by the man who may have been one of the most notorious CIA officers in history is the same as the present Prime Minister of Grenada. When Antonio Veciana was introduced to CIA officer Maurice Bishop in Havana in 1960, Maurice Bishop of Grenada was a 17-year-old student.



Church Committee composite sketch of "Maurice Bishop," Lee Harvey Oswald's case officer

NEXT RIGHT

David Atlee Phillips, who calls the allegation that he is Maurice Bishop "monstrous"

fact, David Atlee Phillips, and that he was implicated in the Kennedy assassination.

During the time of the Cuban missile crisis Phillips was chief of covert action in Mexico City, and in charge of Cuban operations. Fonzi, speaking of Bishop, notes that "the headaches that Alpha 66 created for President Kennedy before and during the Cuban missile crisis were planned by Maurice Bishop. The timing of the raids on Cuba at the height of the missile crisis, when Kennedy was negotiating with Khrushchev, was Bishop's idea . . . 'The purpose was to embarrass Kennedy publicly and force him to move against Castro,' Veciana now admits."

The article, coincidentally, notes that Bishop had a morbid sense of historical irony, and often selected the dates for operations based on the anniversary of some psychologically important date, such as October 22, October 31 (Phillips was born on Halloween, October 31, 1922), July 26, and September 11.

October 22, 1972—The Truckers' Strike in Chile. The truckers culminated their national strike with an open call for President Allende's resignation and a "Day of Silence." The mobilization of private truckers and women that day occurred outside the structure of the traditional conservative political parties, a fact which was offered as evidence of the group's "independence." In fact, it was a David Phillips operation and the instructions for assembly went out through CIA-controlled media.

October 20, 1973—The Saturday Night Massacre. This was the night that Alexander Haig fired Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox on the orders of President Nixon.

October 31, 1974—The Assassination of Carlos Prats. General Prats had been General Schneider's successor as Army Chief of Staff under Allende. While in exile in Buenos Aires, Argentina, his car was bombed by an assassination team led by Juan Bulnes and Michael Townley. Bulnes was indicted and convicted in the Schneider assassination; Townley later went on to execute the Orlando Letelier-Ronni Moffitt assassinations. While the Prats killing was a DINA operation, it was executed by two individuals who began their careers in intelligence work in 1970 for the CIA, under David Phillips.

October 31, 1977—The Helms Plea and the Halloween Massacre. This was the day that former CIA Director Richard Helms pleaded no contest in Federal Court to charges of having lied under oath to the Senate committee investigating CIA activities in Chile in October 1970. That night, approximately 800 CIA officers, mostly from covert operations, were fired.

October 22, 1979—The Shah Enters the U.S. After several months of pressure by Kissinger, Helms, Nixon, and David Rockefeller, Secretary of State Vance and President Carter allows the ailing—and deposed—Shah of Iran to enter the United States, precipitating the demonstrations in Tehran which led, two weeks later, to the takeover of the

U.S. Embassy, and 14 months of embarrassment for the Carter Administration. Documents surfaced from the Embassy which indicated that the administraton had been warned that the admission of the Shah would have serious repercussions, including danger to the Embassy. It is an open question whether the plotters knew the predictable outcome, and sought to embarrass the Administration.

While intentions are always hard to assess, it always helps to see what Robert Moss was saying. In Foreign Report he blamed the situation in Iran on Carter and the Congress, for having "cowed the CIA." His suggested solution is that "perhaps two million people should march through the streets of every Western capital, as they do in Tehran, but declaiming against populist politicians, not kings." Almost a year later, when Carter attempted to rectify the situation by the ill-fated CIA-Pentagon rescue mission, Moss' friend Miles Copeland, former head of the Game Room at the CIA, leaked all the details in advance to the Washington Star. If anything, CIA psychological warfare is designed to rattle people's nerves.

As many of the examples demonstrate, psychological warfare, especially disinformation, is also designed to produce the polarization of information. What appears from the analysis of disinformation campaigns is that, contrary to popular belief, it is not the polarization of society which leads to the polarization of information, but precisely the reverse. As in Chile, the systematic introduction of scientifically-prepared disinformation into the internal communications system artificially created crisis after crisis.

Some Other Examples. As a footnote to this rundown of the significance of October 22, a look at Ray Cline's memoire, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, is interesting. He explains the importance to him of October 22: "The first important OSS covert action operation overseas took place in North Africa where, on October 22, Eisenhower's deputy, General Mark Clark, made a secret rendezvous, traveling by submarine to a point on the French African coast . . . On the last day [of the Cuban missile crisis], October 22, 1962, I helped draft the President's speech . . . The most successful CIA secret agent . . . Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, was arrested on October 22.

Moles

The major themes of the disinformation campaigns of the past decade, geared fundamentally to increasing hostility toward the Soviet Union and its allies, toward sabotaging detente, have been: a Soviet role in international terrorism; Soviet penetration of the U.S. media; a Soviet plan for World War III; and the prevalence of Soviet moles.

Mole fever began as a British disease. British intelligence leaked the fact that Anthony Blount was the "fourth man" in the celebrated Philby-MacLean-Burgess affair of the 1950s. Since the case was some thirty years old, and since Blount himself had confessed some fifteen years ago, one might ask why the spectre of Soviet spies was unearthed just as the election campaign was beginning. The Blount case led to a series of articles, books, and TV specials on moles, both factual and fictional.

The British fever was spread to the U.S. by Michael Ledeen and Robert Moss, each in their own policy journal. Ledeen is the editor of the Georgetown CSIS Washington Quarterly while Moss is an editor of the Heritage Foundation Policy Review. Both are targeted at Congress, to compete with the Council on Foreign Relations' Foreign Policy.

All the major powers undoubtedly have some agents in the others' governments. The disinformation enters in artificially puffing up the issue, both before the last British election and before the U.S. elections, as a tactical deception to smear liberal politicians and to serve as a pretext for a purge of liberals from the foreign policy bureaucracy.

This was evident when Michael Ledeen attempted to portray Billy Carter as a Soviet-backed Libyan agent, and when Robert Moss tried to picture Carter National Security Council Advisor David Aaron as a Soviet mole. A psychological buildup was designed to lend credibility to totally spurious charges aimed at embarrassing the Administration.



Michael Ledeen

Assisting Moss in the Aaron operation were Mark Schneider, David Sullivan, Angelo Codevilla, Ronald Reagan, and William Schneider. When Moss and Crozier set up the Institute of American Relations on Capitol Hill, one of its chief propagandists was William Schneider. Schneider, along with Moss, was editing Heritage Foundation publications. In the first issue of Policy Review, in 1977, readers were informed that U.S. foreign policy was in the hands of a mafia of Senate staffers, particularly the Intelligence Committee. Even the New York Times concluded (December 11, 1980) that "the unfounded allegations about Mr. Aaron were disseminated around Washington by Republican staff members in the Senate in an apparent effort to embarrass the Carter Administration before the Presidential election." Daniel Schorr had suggested that it was staffers Sullivan, Codevilla, and Schneider who spread the disinformation, which had originated with Robert Moss. Mark Schneider, after the elections, moved to the Reagan transition team for CIA; Sullivan to the team for arms control; and William

Schneider to the team for defense. All three reported to Richard Allen and David Abshire—who were, not coincidentally, the founder and director of the CSIS.

More Moles


After the New York Times and Schorr exposed the falsity of the mole fever, the group had to deliver the goods. Two stories emerged, hitting the newspapers on: October 22, 1980. The first announced that a Christopher Boyce Task Force had been created, to track down the alleged Soviet spy who had mysteriously escaped from prison the previous January, under circumstances strongly suggesting U.S. intelligence help. The precise spot in the California desert where he was suspected of hiding was identified, and lurid headlines abounded.

Then, the same day, the David Barnett story surfaced, charging that the KGB had paid a mole \$100,000 to attempt to infiltrate none other than the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Of course it subsequently developed that, even if the Barnett story is true (and many people believe that he was at best a double agent, exposed to protect his cover), he was never a mole; the Committee did not hire him.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is submitted that the recent elections, whatever other forces may have been at work, was to a large extent manipulated by this cabal of disgruntled former intelligence officers and politicians, the most active of whom have been called the October 22 Movement. Whether in or out of office, the group has acted with the single goal of secretly influencing U.S. foreign policy. Over the last five years they have acted through the AFIO, CSIS and the Heritage Foundation, spreading disinformation. The campaign was extremely successful, providing the leadership for all four Reagan transition teams for foreign policy, and their members and supporters have moved into numerous Administration positions. The October 22 Movement, assisted by propagandists who were veterans of CIA media operations, have discredited Carter's foreign policy, and, more importantly, revived the Cold War, through leaks, planted stories, black propaganda, forgeries, deceptions, and scare stories. The themes have remained constant, and will undoubtedly flourish in the next several years.

In an Administration filled with experts in disinformation, that technique will surely play a major role. Disinformation is designed to fool the population; diligence will be required to see through it, and to expose it.



NAMING NAMES

This issue CAIB reports on twelve CIA officers overseas, comprising five Chiefs of Station, one Deputy Chief of Station, and six case officers. Four of these individuals have not previously been exposed at any posting.

Australia

CIA veteran Michael C. Sednaoui is the new Chief of Station in Canberra, Australia. Sednaoui, born November 6, 1925 in Egypt, has been with the CIA since at least 1956, when he served briefly under cover as a "political affairs officer" with the Department of the Army, before being posted that year, under State Department cover, to the Rabat, Morocco Embassy. He served in Rabat until at least 1970, except for two years back at Headquarters. There are no Department of State records referring to him from late 1970 until late 1974, when he was posted to Rome, where he served as Deputy Chief of Station until at least 1976. He was exposed in the January 15, 1976 edition of La Repubblica in Rome as the chief of the CIA unit under cover as the so-called United States Army Southern European Projects Unit. According to the October 1980 Canberra Diplomatic List Sednaoui is there under cover of attache, undoubtedly the Chief of Station.

Bolivia

A well-known CIA paramilitary expert is now in the La Paz, Bolivia Embassy. William Adger Moffett, III, born November 27, 1939 in California, served under cover as a "programs analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1967 to 1973. In 1973 he assumed diplomatic cover as an economic-commercial officer at the Port-au-Prince, Haiti Embassy. He is known to have special training and expertise in liaison operations with right-wing and paramilitary groups, and during his two years in Haiti, his assignment was to coordinate with the Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad. In mid-1975 he returned to Headquarters. Resuming his involvement with violent right-wing groups, he was posted to Kingston, Jamaica in November 1978, where he worked with the more violent right-wing opposition to the then government of Michael Manley. Moffett was exposed in a local Jamaican paper in 1979, and was one of those named by CAIB in its Kingston press conference in July 1980. According to sources in Jamaica, he left the island in September. A Bolivian journalist has noted his appearance at the La Paz Embassy at least as of December 1980. Given the current intensity of the right-wing oppression in Bolivia, it is a natural posting for a CIA officer with Moffett's expertise.

Italy

The August 1980 Rome Diplomatic List's entry for the

United States of America reads almost like a Who's Who in the CIA. At least eight CIA officers are on the list, the Chief of Station, the Deputy Chief of Station, and six case officers. With so many officers under light, high-level diplomatic cover, the Rome station must be large indeed.

The Chief of Station for Italy is Frederick Dalziel Vreeland, born June 24, 1927 in Connecticut. Vreeland has been with the CIA since 1951, and has served in Geneva, Switzerland; Berlin and Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany; Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika; Rabat, Morrocco; United Nations Headquarters, New York; and Paris, France. In CAIB Number 3 (January 1979), we noted that Vreeland had been transferred to Italy in late 1978, where he served as Deputy Chief of Station under Hugh Montgomery. Since Montgomery has departed Italy it seems clear that Vreeland is now Chief of Station.

Vreeland's Deputy is Roger Laurent Pierre, born October 6, 1922 in New York, Pierre has also been with the Agency since 1951, when he commenced three years as a "political analyst" for the Department of Defense. Since then he has served under diplomatic cover in Saigon, Vietnam, and in Casablanca, Morocco. In 1966 he apparently resumed cover other than diplomatic, as no State Department records refer to him from that time. However, he has resurfaced at the Rome Embassy, posted there, according to the Diplomatic List, in October 1979, as attache.

Duane R. Clarridge, born April 16, 1932 in New Hampshire, is a case officer posted to Rome in August 1979. Clarridge has served in Kathmandu, Nepal; New Delhi and Madras, India; Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey—where, from 1971 till at least 1973 he was Deputy Chief of Station. He does not appear in State Department records from late 1973, and is next noted in the Rome Diplomatic List.

Another veteran case officer in Rome is **Donald J. Healey**, born July 11, 1931 in New Jersey. Healey spent from 1958 to 1961 under cover as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army—as noted many times in this *Bulletin*, a completely phony, non-existent position used in the *Biographic Register* for CIA people. From 1962 to 1966 he was, according to State Department publications, a research analyst for a private "industrial surveys associates" firm, an indication of CIA work under deep cover. He then worked with AID, before posting to Hong Kong, Saigon, and Paris, where he arrived in late 1974. He next appears on the Rome Diplomatic List as an attache, posted there in September 1978.

Another Rome case officer is Naran Sansha Ivanchukov, born December 12, 1937 in Bulgaria. He served in Taichung, Taiwan; Saigon, Vietnam; and Rangoon, Burma, before his posting to Rome in June 1979, under cover of First Secretary.

Yet another case officer in Rome is Eugene G. Vincent. Vincent served in Khartoum, Sudan from 1973 to 1975 and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 1975 to 1978, before returning to Headquarters. According to the Rome Diplomatic List, he was transferred there in July 1980.

In addition to the above newly-discovered postings, it should be noted that the August 1980 Rome Diplomatic List confirms the continued presence there of two case officers previously exposed. These are Vincent M. Cannistraro, whose full biography appears in "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," and Charles Ronald Emmling, whose biography appeared in CAIB Number 7.

Cannistraro, born January 10, 1940, served in Mogadiscio, Somalia, and in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, before being posted to Rome as of at least October 1978. Emmling served in Rangoon, Burma and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, before posting to Rome in July 1979.

Mexico

Mexican journalists continue to keep tabs on CIA personnel there, a worthwhile exercise given the importance which the U.S. government in general, and the CIA in particular ascribe to **Mexico**. As noted in *CAIB* Number 3, former Director William E. Colby has described Mexico as the single greatest threat to the U.S. Indeed, the right-wing film "Attack on the Americas," discussed elsewhere in this issue, paints the picture of a "Communist attack on the Americas," sweeping up to the Rio Grande.

As was noted in CAIB Number 3, the Mexico City newspaper El Universal reported on October 12, 1978 that the former CIA Chief of Station Thomas Polgar had been replaced by Lawrence Melvin Sternfield. Recently, on November 25, 1980, Excelsior, a leading Mexico City daily, noted that Sternfield had departed and was replaced as Chief of Station by Stewart D. Burton, who arrived there in October 1978 and took over as CoS when Sternfield departed. Burton's biography appears in "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," which notes his lengthy service, with postings in Sao Paulo, Brazil; Buenos Aires, Aregentina; Curitiba, Brazil; Georgetown, British Guiana; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Lima, Peru; Santiago, Chile; and Brasilia, Brazil; before his move to Mexico.

According to Excelsior's well-informed columnist, Manuel Buendia, Burton was "sent to Mexico by George Bush with special orders to carry out several dynamitings, kidnappings, and finally the necessary murders." The article states that the U.S. has a total of some 450 staff members at the Mexico City Embassy and in eleven consular offices throughout the country, making it certain that Burton at present is overseeing a very large CIA station.



WILL OVERTHROW THE PEOPLE!

Uruguay

Veteran CIA officer Robert L. Fambrini, who had the dubious distinction of serving as Chief of Station in Managua, Nicaragua from 1976 until at least late 1979, allowing him to witness, much to his dismay, the triumph of the Sandinistas, has appeared in Montevideo, Uruguay, where he is undoubtedly Chief of Station. Fambrini has been with the CIA since at least 1957, when he trained under cover as an "analyst" for the Department of the Army. He then served a few years at the Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Embassy, before embarking on some ten years' deep cover work, listed as an analyst for an unnamed foreign trade consultant firm. He then served in Salvador and Belo Horizonte, Brazil; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; before his posting to Managua. A returning American journalist has indicated to CAIB that Fambrini was hard at work in Montevideo at least as of October 1980.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Books

Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney Australia: 1980. This book explores in detail the nature of U.S. intelligence operations in Australia, including the

CIA complex at Pine Gap, whose true nature was kept secret from the Australian government, not merely the Australian people. The picture of U.S. operations in Australia would be complete with the addition of another new book, "Documents on Australia's Defense and Foreign Policy, 1968-74," but the publication of that book was prevented by a court injunction obtained by the government.

At the time of the injunction, Australia's former Ambassador to the United States was quoted as describing the current Australian administration as "the most secretive in Australia's history." Senior officials, he said, were "indifferent to concepts of public accountability."

Donald Freed with Fred Landis, Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier, Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport, CT: 1980, paper \$6.95; cloth \$12.95. A thorough look at the complex machinations which led to the 1976 assassination in Washington of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, including the role of the CIA, the DINA, the Chilean junta, and the Cuban exiles. Freed and Landis look particularly at the role of the ubiquitous David Atlee Phillips, and at the cover-up role of then CIA Director George Bush, now Vice-President.

George O'Toole, The Private Sector: Rent-a-cops, Private Spies and the Police-Industrial Complex, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York: 1978; \$10.95. The author, a former CIA electronic surveillance specialist, is no leftist but he is appalled at the way private police, often mistaken for "real" police officers, are running wild. As the jacket blurb notes, "There are one million policemen in America, and only half of them are sworn to uphold the law." We are not convinced that there is a great deal of control over the "real" cops, but we agree with O'Toole that the major problem with the private police is the absence of any control. A good summary of the police-industrial complex.

Victor Serge, What Everyone Should Know About State Repression, New Park Publications, London, England: 1979; available for \$4.00, postpaid, from Anti-Repression Resource Team, Box 122, Jackson, MS 39205. Victor Serge was a revolutionary who was involved in nearly every major communist uprising in Europe from 1908 through 1923, in Belgium, France, Spain, Russia, and Germany. From 1919 to 1923 he worked with Zinoviev in the Executive of the Communist International. However, in 1923 he split with the Bolsheviks, siding eventually with Trotsky, leading ultimately to exile in Mexico. This book, written mostly in 1921, is, regardless of one's politics, a classic. It describes the operations of the Tsar's secret police, the Okhrana, and all the mechanics of repression. It includes intriguing sections on "the problem of illegality" and on "the problem of revolutionary repression," and an invaluable section entitled "simple advice to revolutionaries," dealing with being followed, putting things in writing, using the mails and telephones, and the like. The contemporary value of these essays written sixty years ago is astonishing.

Wheaton, Philip, Agrarian Reform in El Salvador: A Program of Rural Pacification, EPICA Task Force, 1470 Irving St., NW, Washington, DC 20010; \$2.50 plus \$.50 postage in U.S. This pamphlet presents an historical and analytical review of the use of agrarian reform as a tool of counter-insurgency pacification. It is critical reading for an understanding of the real role of the program in El Salvador, including that of the U.S. advisors and of AIFLD. EPICA publishes many valuable research items on Latin America; write to them for their materials list.

Periodicals

Alternative Press Index, quarterly, Alternative Press Center, Inc., P.O. Box 7229, Baltimore, MD 21218; \$25/year individuals, \$80/year libraries. Presents subject indexes of many alternative publications, including CAIB; extremely helpful for researchers. For example, some of the other publications indexed of possible interest to CAIB readers include: Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Cuba Review, Guardian, Guild Notes, In These Times, Mother Jones, NACLA, Progressive, Southern Africa, etc.

CALA Newsletter, bimonthly, Community Action on Latin America, Madison Campus Ministry, 731 State Street, Madison, WI 53703; price not given. An informative news bulletin with news covering all of Latin America.

El Salvador, bimonthly, Religious Task Force for El Salvador, 1747 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009. Sent to contributors. A short but informative newspaper particularly focusing on human rights and the church in El Salvador

El Salvador Alert, Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, P.O. Box 12056, Washington, D.C. 20005; \$5/6 mo., \$10/year. The CISPES news bulletin is essential for following the struggle in El Salvador. Additional contributions are obviously appreciated and needed. CISPES also distributes the following: "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America," \$1.50; "Information Packet," \$3.00; "El Salvador—A Brief Overview," \$.50; and "U.S. Out of El Salvador" buttons, \$1.00, \$.60 each for orders of more than 15. CISPES publishes or distributes many valuable items; write for their resource list.

Lateinamerika Nachrichten, monthly, FDCL, Savignyplatz 5, 1000 Berlin 15, Fed. Rep. Germany; DM35/year. If you read German, this is an extremely valuable bulletin with in-depth reporting on virtually evey nation in Latin America.

News from Guatemala, P.O. Box 335, Station R, Toronto, Ont., Canada M4G 4C3; \$5.80, U.S. air; \$10.00, other air. Reprints of items from many publications dealing with Guatemala.

Newsfront International, monthly, Peoples Translation Service, 4428 Telegraph Ave., Oakland, CA 94609; \$13/6 mo., \$22/year, \$40/overseas air. Translations from around the world dealing with anti-imperialist and Third World struggles. A valuable reference source with material which English readers would otherwise never see.

Thailand Update, bimonthly, Union of Democratic Thais, P.O. Box 17808, Los Angeles, CA 90017. Newsletter covering the struggles of progressive forces in Thailand.

This Is The Time, monthly, Southern Africa Organizing Committee, P.O. Box 11376, San Francisco, CA 94101. \$2.50/year U.S.; \$5/year overseas. Newsletter dealing with U.S. government and corporate support for the racist regimes of Southern Africa.

(continued from page 48)

elaborate and expensive, the most advanced so far being an electronic scanner which can detect the carbon used in most kinds of ink. Duncan Campbell described the use of both of these techniques by the British government in the New Statesman.²

According to Iranian revolutionaries, a captured U.S.-manufactured scanning device which displayed the contents of letters on a television tube was used by a SAVAK clerk in Ahwaz, Khuzistan. They said the machine could display separately writing from different folds or sides of letters without opening the envelopes.


The now-defunct Dublin newspaper, *Hibernia*, described a less-expensive but serviceable technology that accomplishes much the same thing, used by the British Army in the

2. February 1, 1980, page 160. Jack Anderson, in a July 1975 column, summarized some of William Colby's secret testimony on mail surveillance before a House subcommittee: "Colby disclosed that the CIA is able to read mail without opening it. A secret chemical, whose name we cannot reveal for security reasons, enables the CIA to decipher writing inside sealed envelopes."

North and by the Irish Special Branch in the Free State—the fiberscope.³ A flexible fiber optics probe serves as the lens for a television camera. The device can be slipped through the flap of an envelope or into a tiny hole in a parcel; if the initial scan indicates contents of interest to the intelligence agencies, the item can then be opened for a more complete inspection.

The old, tired and true horse-and buggy techniques of mail reading are still widely used, of course. These include tools such as special long, thin pliers used to roll up letters and remove them through the open corners of envelopes, and special solvents to unglue the flaps, as well as steam teakettles. During one of its massive mail opening programs, the CIA developed a steam "oven" to handle 100 letters at a time, but its performance failed to meet its promise, so the agents returned to their "kettle and stick" method. According to the Church Committee, the FBI developed a method much more efficient than the CIA's, reducing the time required to open a letter to one or two seconds, as against the CIA's five to fifteen seconds.⁴ An

- 3. November 15, 1979 and February 7, 1980.
- 4. Book III, page 646.





instruction book titled CIA Flaps and Seals Manual is available to do-it-yourself snoops from a number of distributors who advertise in Soldier of Fortune magazine (although it does not appear to be a genuine Agency publication).

With all these methods at the disposal of government spies, how can you tell if they're reading mail, especially since the new devices don't leave the tell-tale indications of poor spycraft that often used to show up when novices staffed the teakettles? Usually only when someone leaks the truth, or when one of the snoops slips up. With the volume of mail they watch, this happens more often than you might think.

In Ireland a Dublin activist who was also a postman was once ordered to set aside his own mail for surveillance. In Britain, the anarchist magazine *Freedom* once received its mail complete with a cover note from the surveillance unit to a local postal official, and there have been numerous cases of mail addressed to one leftist organization being delivered to another.

In 1975 a batch of letters addressed to the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington was delivered to the Center for the Study of Responsive Law at an entirely different address. Although the Postmaster General and the Chief Postal Inspector denied there was any surveillance of these and other public interest organizations, the episode did lead to disclosure of the previously confidential mail cover procedures, published in *Surveillance Part 2* by the Kastenmeier Subcommittee.⁵

I had a similar experience myself this past year. The Jackson, Mississippi, postmaster had denied, in writing, that my mail was subject to any form of surveillance. Yet in June I received a letter addressed to an organization with which I am affiliated in Tougaloo, Mississippi, but which was delivered to my office in downtown Jackson.

Under these circumstances, what should we believe, the circumstantial evidence of surveillance, or the post office's denials? An interesting document published by the Church Committee may help furnish the best answer. It is a 1962 memorandum by the Deputy Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff discussing Project HTLINGUAL which raises the possibility of a "flap" over the mail opening program; the pertinent parts read as follows:

"Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any Government Agency. Therefore, it is most important that all Federal law enforcement and U.S. Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any such activity as charged . . ."

"As to the behavior of the Post Office Department after a compromise takes place, we are hardly in a position to dictate. It might be expected, however, that they will deny the abuse of mails charged and indicate the matter is being referred to the Postal Inspection Service for investigation. Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the Project, it should be relatively easy to 'hush up' the entire affair, or to explain that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the request of authorized Federal agencies. Under the most unfavorable circumstances, including the support of charges with interior items from the Project, it might become necessary, after the matter has cooled off during an extended period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering with the mails."

So far the CIA and FBI have not had to find a scapegoat on whom to blame their mail surveillance activities, though willingness to employ this tactic when caught red-handed was amply demonstrated by the treatment of the agent assigned to spy on the House Assassinations Committee when he was found rummaging through the committee's safe. He was, of course, a "rogue elephant;" the CIA would never sanction such conduct.

Let no one believe this agency has been reformed. •

National Conservative Political Action Committee

1500 wilson blvd. suite 513 arlington, va. 22209 (703) 522-2800

To who it may concern:

The enclosed material was sent to us by mistake. Therefore, we are forwarding it on to you. We regret that the material was opened in error and apologize for any inconvenience.

Sincerely yours,

Candace M. Taw Office Manager

CMT:nkm

Enclosure

Mail Surveillance Evidence

The National Conservative Political Action Committee, a New Right umbrella organization, receives, CAIB has learned, so much mail addressed to other organizations that it has a form letter for returning the material, shown above. These form letters have been used to forward mail addressed to progressive organizations with completely different names and addresses, even in different states.

This would appear to be further evidence of current and massive mail cover operations in the Washington, DC area. While there is no indication whether NCPAC is involved in the operation or not, it is of interest that the form letter presumes the opening of the mail in question, despite the different addresses.

^{5.} Serial Number 26, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 1975, pages 950-979.

^{6.} Hearings, Volume 4, pages 222-223. Retyped from indistinct copy. Typographical errors corrected according to a somewhat misleading excerpt published in the 1975 Rockefeller Commission report, page 107.

NEWS NOTES

ACCURACY IN MEDIA?

Regular readers of this magazine will be amused at the irony of a recent fund appeal in which British disinformation specialist Robert Moss solicits members for an organization called Accuracy In Media (AIM). [See "Robert Moss' Obsession" by Philip Agee, in CAIB Number 7, and "Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Right-Wing Disinformation" by Fred Landis in CAIB Number 10.] Moss offers a free copy of his bestselling smear The Spike to new AIM members and contributors.

It will be interesting to see if AIM's right-wing director, Reed Irvine, will comment on the accuracy of Moss' Foreign Report as a part of his crusade. A recent issue of that slender pale-blue newsletter smeared a number of prominent retired military officers from Western countries who aren't sufficiently hawkish in Moss' view. The article [November 26, 1980 Foreign Report] claimed that a September symposium in Sofia, Bulgaria, was attended by former NATO officers Brigadier Michael Harbottle and Major General Tony Younger of Great Britain, General Jacques de Bollardiere of France, and Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque of the U.S., and that those who attended the meeting, organized by the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace, were being "exploited by the Russians." It went on

to say that Brigadier Harbottle agreed to organize a similar, larger conference in December.

As it turned out, none of these officers had attended the Sofia conference, or had any connection with it whatever, and Brigadier Harbottle had no knowledge of any future conference, let alone plans to help organize one, so *Foreign Report* had to publish a retraction [January 7, 1981], apologizing to these men for "any embarrassment or harm which they may have been caused."

Moss' columns in the London Daily Telegraph are equally disinformative. In a recent diatribe against U.S.-born BBC journalist Steve Weissman, Moss confused him with the Stephen Weissman who is on the staff of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and who is the author of "The CIA and U.S. Policy in Zaire and Angola," which appears in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa. He was forced to publish an apology to "the Capitol Hill Mr. Weissman" [December 8, 1980 Daily Telegraph], although he coyly deflected any personal blame: "My sources, usually reliable intelligence analysts, have been appropriately chastised."

OFFICIAL SECRETS PROSECUTION IN NORWAY

In CAIB Number 9 we published Fred Samia's detailed examination of the NSA and CIA spying network in Norway. The groundbreaking research in that field had been done by Owen Wilkes of New Zealand, at that time with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), and now with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and by Nils Petter Gleditsch of Norway, a reasearch fellow at the Oslo Institute. In February 1979 they published a report on technical intelligence stations in Norway maintained by the CIA and NSA. The report, which caused great controversy in Norway, led almost immediately to a well-publicized police investigation.

The Oslo public prosecutor has now announced the filing of charges against the authors, who have maintained throughout that the report was compiled exclusively from open sources, including the observation of the stations from public places. The authorities have charged, however, that the report violates provisions of the Norwegian

penal code which makes it an offense to compile and publish information which should have been kept secret because of Norway's security relations with other countries.

Wilkes and Gleditsch insist that the information, though almost unknown to the general public, is readily ascertainable and was undoubtedly well known to other nations' intelligence and surveillance agencies, including the Soviet Union's. They also point out that the application of an official secrets act to this information is, in effect, attempting to keep American secrets, not Norwegian ones, and that the information is irrelevant to the security of Norway itself.

There is no legal precedent in Norway for such charges, although during the past several years similar charges involving journalists and, in one case, a retired intelligence officer, have been brought. For further information, contact PRIO, Radhusgt. 5, Oslo 1, Norway.

Other News

- Northern Neighbors reports that a Soviet college textbook titled Principles of Electronic Warfare can't be sold in the U.S. because the information it contains is classified here. The book "describes highly advanced radars; they 'seek out'enemy radars; they 'tune in' on enemy radars, use them; they really screw up enemy planes, missiles, guided by radar." The book is considered a beginner's text in the Soviet Union.
- Ever since 1974, when Afrique-Asie published correspondence between the former fascist Portuguese government and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, documenting their

collaboration in the war against MPLA, Savimbi has denied collaborating with the colonial authorities, and has claimed that the documents are forgeries. Few believed the denials, especially since Captain Sousa e Castro, a member of the Portuguese military ruling body, the Revolutionary Council, who sits on the commission set up to investigate PIDE, the Caetano regime's secret police, has confirmed that Savimbi indeed did work for the colonial army and PIDE, and that the documents are authentic. (Translations appear in *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa.*)

Now there is further proof. It comes from the former dictator himself, Marcelo Caetano, who has written a book from exile in Brazil. In the book *Declaration*, he reveals that two lumber merchants were used as go-betweens to coordinate activity between General Bethencourt Rodriguez and UNITA.

SPECIAL OFFER TO OUR READERS

Dirty Work 1: The CIA in Western Europe, the first of this series of startling and invaluable exposes, lists at \$24.95. Dirty Work 2, our latest effort—and the book the U.S. government tried to stop, lists at \$29.95. Current or new subscribers may order these books from us for \$17.50 for Dirty Work 1 and for \$19.00 for Dirty Work 2. This includes surface postage anywhere. For airmail overseas, please add \$8.00 for DW1 or \$6.00 for DW2.

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Sources and Methods

By Ken Lawrence

MAIL SURVEILLANCE

"Between 1940 and 1973, two agencies of the federal government—the CIA and the FBI—covertly and illegally opened and photographed first class letter mail within the United States. These agencies conducted a total of twelve mail opening programs for lengths of time ranging from three weeks to twenty six years. In a single program alone, more than 215,000 communications were intercepted, opened, and photographed."

So begins the Church Committee's final report on mail surveillance which, in both the committee's hearings and in its reports, is referred to as "mail opening." This wording, which may have been chosen in order to differentiate these programs from the more benign—and legal, though still

1. Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Book III, Page 561.

reprehensible—"mail covers" (in which only the information on the outside of the envelope is noted and recorded), is deceptive, for it is now possible to read people's mail without opening the envelopes.

Since the technology employed to read sealed letters is being manufactured in the United States, and its use is promoted by U.S. government and industry, it seems reasonable to conclude that illegal mail surveillance by U.S intelligence agencies did not end in 1973 as the Church Committee suggested.

Methods used to read mail range from the simple and ingenious—such as a spray manufactured by DuPont which renders an envelope temporarily translucent—to the

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